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The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change: An overview 
This document provides an overview of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (FCCC) adopted at the 
United Nations Conference on Environment 
and Development in Rio De Janiero in June 
1992. Rather than discussing every article in 
detail, the overview groups the articles into 
several key categories and described key 
issues in the Convention. The full text of the 
Convention is available on the World Wide 
Web through the FCCC (www. unfccc.de). 
Definitions 
Article 1 clarifies several terms used in the 
Convention. notably: 
• Climate change refers to human induced 
change of the climate, on top of natural 
variability; 
• Greenhouse gases (GHGs) includes all 
atmospheric gases that absorb and re-emit 
infrared radiation; 
• Regional economic integration 
organisation, although not stated, 
essentially refers to the EU; 
• Reservoir is a component of the climate 
system where GHGs are stored, such as 
the oceans; 
• Sink is a process that removes GHGs 
from the atmosphere; 
• Source is a process that releases GHGs 
into the atmosphere. 
NB: Although not in the definitions, it is 
important to note that Annex I Parties are the 
OECD and former Soviet Union and East 
European Countries - ie the industrialised 
countries and countries with economies in 
transition to market economy. Annex II 
countries are the OECD only. 
Objective 
The objective of the FCCC, stated in Article 
2, is to stabilise GHG concentrations in the 
atmosphere (ie not just emissions) to prevent 
dangerous human-induced interference with 
the climate system. The criteria for fulfilling 
this would be that ecosystems can adapt 
naturally, that food production is not 
threatened, and that 'economic development 
can proceed in a sustainable manner'. 
Principles 
Article 3 introduces a number of key 
principles including: 
Common but differentiated responsibility: 
while all countries share responsibility for 
dealing with climate change, those that are 
most responsible and have the greatest 
means should bear the burden of combating 
climate change (ie the industrialised 
countries). 
Precautionary principle: that where threats to 
the climate are serious and irreversible, action 
should be taken even if we do not have 
complete scientific certainty about climate 
change. 
Considering the needs 
countries, particularly those 
to climate change. 
of developing 
most vulnerable 
Right to sustainable development: climate 
change measures should be integrated into 
development plans. 
International economic co-operation (i.e. 
trade): so climate change measures should 
not hinder international trade. 
Commitments 
Article 4 is the longest and most important 
article in the UNFCCC, because it lays out 
the respective commitments of Parties to the 
Convention. 
Article 4.1 lays out commitments for all 
Parties to: 
• publish GHG inventories; 
• publish policies and measures to mitigate 
or adapt to climate change; 
• promote technology transfer; 
• promote sustainable management of sinks 
and reservoirs; 
• co-operate in adaptation plans, e.g. for 
coastal areas, water resources, drought-
affected areas in Africa; 
• consider climate change in all relevant 
social, economic and environmental 
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policies and actions and minimise adverse 
impacts of measures to mitigate climate 
change; 
• promote systematic research and 
observation of the climate system; 
• promote 
awareness; 
education, training and 
• communicate to the Conference of Parties 
on implementation of the Convention. 
Article 4.2 lays out additional commitments 
for Annex I Parties to: 
• return by 2000 to 1990 levels of GHG 
emissions - including the option to 
implement measures jointly, which is the 
basis for the flexible mechanisms 
discussed in the Kyoto Protocol (4.2a); 
• communicate the policies and measures 
to reach this goal, and progress toward 
the goal. within 6 months after the 
Convention enters into force and 
periodically thereafter. (4.2b); 
• report on sinks using best available 
techniques, to be decided at the first COP; 
• co-ordinate economic instruments with 
other parties. 
NB: Article 4.6 provides for some flexibility 
for the countries with economies in transition 
to implement their commitments. 
Article 4.2d calls for a regular review of the 
adequacy of Annex I commitments (not 
those in Article 4.1), at the first COP and then 
again no later than December 1998. The 
COP is to take action to update commitments 
to meet the objective of the Convention. 
Article 4.2f calls on the COP by December 
1998 to review the lists in Annex I and Annex 
II. 
Article 4.2g allows for voluntary 
commitments by non-Annex Parties, by 
agreeing to be bound by the commitments in 
Article 4.2a and b. 
Article 4.3 to 4.5 refer to additional 
commitments of Annex II Parties to 
provide new and additional financial 
resources to meet the 'full agreed costs 
incurred by developing country parties' in 
meeting their commitments. Article 4. 7 even 
says that developing countries can not 
implement their commitments without this 
assistance. Developing countries, therefore 
should not have to pay the additional costs of 
the commitments outlined in Article 4.1 
Annex II Parties are to pay particular 
attention to the needs of the most vulnerable 
countries and to promote environmentally 
sound technology transfer. 
Articles 4.8 and 4. 9 refer to the special needs 
of countries that are most vulnerable to 
the adverse impacts of climate change (i.e 
many poor developing countries or small 
island states) or the impact of 
implementing climate change mitigation 
measures (i.e. fossil fuel-exporting 
countries). Article 4.10 refers specifically to 
assisting countries that will be adversely 
affecting by implementation measures, 
notably fossil fuel-exporting countries or 
those heavily dependent on fossil fuels for 
their economies. 
In addition, Article 12 requires countries to 
report on implementation of the 
Convention. All Parties must report on their 
GHG inventory, general steps taken to 
implement the Convention, and other 
relevant information. Annex I Parties must 
in addition provide a detailed description of 
policies and measures to implement their 
emissions reduction commitments, and the 
effectiveness of those measures. Annex II 
Parties shall also report on their activities to 
finance implementation of the Convention. 
Annex I Parties have six months for their first 
communication after the Convention enters 
into force. Non-Annex I Parties have three 
years, and will receive technical support from 
the COP. Least-developed countries have no 
specific deadline. Future communications 
deadlines are set by the COP. 
Further co-operation 
Articles 5 and 6 call on all Parties to co-
operate in research and systematic 
observation and in education, training and 
awareness programmes regarding climate 
change. 
Governance 
Articles 7-11 and 13-14 lay out the 
governance and implementation framework 
for the FCCC. Article 7 establishes the 
Conference of the Parties to meet every 
year and, among other tasks, to: 
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• examine the obligations and institutional 
arrangements of the Convention; 
• promote exchange of information on 
measures to mitigate climate change; 
• facilitate co-ordination of measures 
between Parties; 
• promote the refinement of methodologies 
for inventories and evaluating mitigation 
measures; 
• assess the implementation of the 
Convention, and make 
recommendations; 
• mobilise financial resources to implement 
the Convention; 
• agree on rules of procedure by 
consensus; 
• allow international organisations, and 
other governmental and non-
governmental organisations to participate 
as observers 
Article 8 establishes the Secretariat to make 
arrangements for COPs, collect and distribute 
information, assist with communication of 
information on implementation, prepare 
reports and co-ordinate with other 
Conventions. 
The two main subsidiary bodies 
Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) and 
Subsidiary Body for Implementation 
(SBI) - are established in Articles 9 and 10. 
The role of SBSTA is to provide an 
assessment of scientific knowledge about 
climate change and the effect of measures 
taken to implement the Convention. SBSTA 
also will identify relevant technologies and 
how to transfer them, provide advice on 
research programmes, and respond to 
technical questions from the COP and other 
bodies. The role of SBI is to monitor the 
information communicated about 
implementation of the Convention, to assess 
the aggregate effects of these measures, and 
carry out reviews of the adequacy of 
commitments. Both these bodies have 
representatives from all Parties to the 
Convention. 
The Financial Mechanism of the 
Convention, as specified in Article 11, 
provides financial resources on a grant or 
4 
concessional basis, and should be governed 
by balanced representation from the Parties. 
The financial mechanism is to ensure that 
funding conforms with criteria laid down by 
the COP and to estimate the funding 
requirements for implementing the 
Convention. A permanent funding 
mechanism is to be decided within four years 
of the first COP. The interim funding 
mechanism (Article 21) is the Global 
Environmental Facility. 
The COP was to decide on a multilateral 
consultative process to resolve questions 
about implementation of the Convention 
(Article 13) at its first session, but this 
decision has been postponed. Disputes can 
be raised under Article 14, however, and 
Parties may agree, upon ratification of the 
Convention, to the possibility of submitting 
their disputes to the International Court of 
Justice or another arbitration mechanism 
decided by the COP. They are not required 
to agree to this, and can withdraw their 
agreement at a later date. A conciliation 
commission can also be created at the 
request of a Party, with representation from 
each sides of the dispute, and Parties 
undertake to carry out the judgements in 
good faith. 
International legal requirements 
Articles 15 through 26 lay out the 
international legal framework for amending, 
updating, and bringing the Convention into 
force. All decisions should be made by 
consensus wherever possible, but, failing that, 
amendments to the Convention and the 
Annexes can be made by three fourths vote 
(Article 15 and 16). Parties can choose not to 
accept new Annexes and amendments to 
Annexes. Protocols may be adopted by the 
COP at any ordinary session (Article 1 7). 
Each Party has one vote in all decisions, 
except where a regional economic integration 
organisation votes as a bloc, in which case 
they have as many votes as they have 
member states (Article 18). 
Article 21 established an interim secretariat 
and designated the Global Environmental 
Facility as the interim financial mechanism. 
The Convention was open for signature from 
June 1992 to June 1993, and thereafter 
opened for ratification, with Parties 
depositing their instruments of ratification 
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with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (Articles 20, 22). The Convention 
enters into force 90 days after the fiftieth 
country has ratified (Article 23). From three 
Annex I 
Australia 
Austria 
Belarus 
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Canada 
Czechoslovakia 
Denmark 
European Economic Community 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
years after entry into force, any Party may 
withdraw from the Convention with one 
year's notice (Article 25). 
Annex II 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
European Economic Community 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
United States of America 
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The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change: An overview 
This document provides an overview of the 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC). The Protocol was adopted at the 
close of the third Conference of the Parties to 
the FCCC in Kyoto, Japan in December 
1997. Rather than discussing every article, 
the sections below focus on highlights and 
groups similar articles together. 1 The full text 
of the Protocol is available from the FCCC 
web site. 
Policies and measures 
After brief opening provisions, Article 2 
elaborates the policies and measures that 
Parties to the Protocol may use to implement 
the provisions of the Protocol. This list is not 
compulsory or exhaustive, but includes a 
range of domestic actions, and encourages 
co-operation. These policies must minimise 
the adverse impacts of climate change, 
especially on developing countries and 
countries affected by implementation of the 
provisions of the Convention (e.g. fossil fuel 
exporting countries). 
Commitments 
The heart of the Kyoto Protocol is Article 3, 
which outlines the legally binding 
commitments of Parties. 
Commitment period and reduction 
targets (3.1-3.2, 3.7) Annex B countries 
(those with reduction commitments, 
essentially the same as Annex 1) 2 agreed to 
reduce emissions by at least 5% overall 
compared to 1990 by the commitment period 
of 2008-2012. The average emissions over 
those five years will be compared to the 
targets, rather than only looking at one year. 
Parties must have made 'demonstrable 
progress' by 2005, although the meaning of 
this phrase is not clearly elaborated. 
This discussion draws heavily on Yamin, F 
1998. The Kyoto Protocol: Origins, assessment 
and future challenges. RECIEL 7(2). Pp. 113-
127. 
Annex B has five additional countries: Croatia, 
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Slovakia and Slovenia. 
In addition, Turkey is not in Annex B, but is in 
Annex I to the FCCC. 
Coverage of gases, baselines and sinks 
(3.1, 3.3-3.6) Emissions reduction 
commitments in Article 3.1 focus on 6 GHGs 
(C02 , CH4, N20, Sf6 , HFCs and PFCs), with 
1990 baselines for the first three and 1995 
baselines for the last three. The use of sinks 
as credits against emissions targets is 
restricted to only those human-induced land 
use change and forestry activities that can be 
verifiably measured during the commitment 
period. A process is also initiated to bring 
more sinks into the basket for the second 
commitment period. This is one of the most 
complex areas of the Protocol, and will be 
developed following an IPCC special report 
on sinks. Articles 3.5 and 3.6 reaffirm the 
possibility of flexibility in baselines and 
implementation for countries with economies 
in transition. 
Differentiated assigned amounts (Annex 
B, 3.7) A central feature of the Kyoto 
Protocol is the differentiated targets for 
Annex I countries. The US, Europe and 
Japan have targets of -7%, -8% and -6%, 
respectively. Some countries are actually 
allowed increases (e.g. Australia +8%) while 
others are only required to stabilise (e.g. 
Russia, Ukraine, New Zealand). 
Future commitments (3.9) A review of 
commit-ments must be carried out at least 
seven years before the end of the first 
commitment period (e.g. 2005) to strengthen 
commitments. Note that if countries have 
surplus emissions at the end of the first 
commitment period (very likely for Russia 
and Ukraine), they can 'bank' those for the 
next commitment period (Article 3.13). 
Minimising adverse impacts on 
developing countries (3.14) Annex I 
parties should implement commitments so as 
to minimise adverse impacts on countries 
mentioned in Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the 
FCCC, particularly the least developed 
countries 
Flexibility mechanisms 
Three explicit flexibility mechanisms are 
established under the convention. In 
addition, the prov1s1on for 'bubbling' 
provides flexibility for countries to reassign 
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their targets as a group. The mechanisms are 
referred to in Articles 3.10-12 as means of 
meeting the legally binding commitments . 
The rules and modalities of all of these 
mechanisms must still be negotiated by the 
COP. A summary of some of the key 
differences in the mechanisms is provide in 
Table 1. 
Bubbling (Article 4) allows Parties to fulfil 
their commitments jointly, so that the EU was 
able to have internal negotiations on burden 
sharing so long as the total EU emissions do 
not exceed the combined targets of its 
members. Parties must inform that Secretariat 
of their intention to create a bubble when 
they ratify the Protocol. 
Emissions trading (Article 17) allows 
Annex B countries to trade surplus emissions 
during the commitment period if they have 
exceeded their commitments. Emissions 
trading should be supplemental to domestic 
action, but no definition of this is provided. 
Joint implementation (Article 6) allows 
Annex I countries to meet their emissions 
reduction commitment with 'emissions 
reduction units' from projects that reduce 
GHG emissions or enhance sinks in other 
Annex I countries. Such projects must be 
approved by both Parties, and must lead to 
em1ss1ons reductions that would not 
otherwise have occurred. JI must also be 
supplemental to domestic action, and can 
only occur between Parties that have fulfilled 
their other commitments to the Convention 
(e.g. reporting). 
Clean development mechanism (Article 
12) allows Annex I parties to meet part of 
their emissions reduction commitments with 
'certified emissions reductions' (CERs) from 
projects that reduce GHG emissions or 
enhance sinks in developing countries -
those that do not have any quantified 
commitments under the Protocol. The 
objective of the COM, in contrast to the other 
mechanisms, is both to contribute to 
sustainable development as well as to assist 
in emissions reductions. The Protocol does 
not specify what share of commitments can 
be met through the COM (or any other 
flexible mechanism). The COM will be 
supervised by an executive board, which 
could assist in arranging funding for project 
activities, while 'operational entities' will 
certify emissions reductions. CERs before 
2008 can be 'banked' - ie accumulated to 
apply against the first commitment period. 
No other flexible mechanism allows banking. 
COM project activities will also pay a levy to 
an adaptation fund, which will help to 
support adaptation in those countries most 
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. 
Developing country 
commitments 
Article 10 elaborates commitments by all 
Parties, including developing countries, but 
does not add significantly to the 
commitments laid out in Article 4.1 of the 
FCCC. The text reaffirms common but 
differentiated responsibilities and that these 
are not new commitments, but rather 
extensions of existing commitments. All of 
these commitments must be implemented 
with consideration for what is required to 
help developing countries, particularly the 
most vulnerable countries. These 
commitments include: 
• improving data on local emissions factors 
and models to update national GHG 
inventories; 
• formulating and communicating 
programmes to mitigate climate change 
and promote adaptation - although 
developing countries are not required to 
implement these activities; 
• co-operating in transferring 
environmentally sound technologies to 
developing countries; 
• co-operating in scientific research and 
observation; and 
• co-operating in education and training 
programmes. 
In addition, Article 11 confirms the principle 
that Annex I Parties must provide new and 
additional funding so that developing 
countries can implement their commitments. 
This includes the agreed full costs of Article 
10.1a related to national communications 
and the agreed full incremental costs of 
commitments under Article 4.1 of the FCCC. 
Institutional arrangements 
Institutional arrangements largely build on 
the FCCC. The Protocol uses the same 
Secretariat and Subsidiary Bodies (Articles 14 
and 15) as the FCCC, for example. The 
Meeting of the Parties (moP) to the Protocol 
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would be handled by the FCCC COP, rather 
than having a new body, although decisions 
about the Protocol during this meeting can 
only be taken by Parties to the Protocol (ie 
those that have ratified the Protocol) (Article 
13). This meeting is called the COP/moP. 
Methodological issues 
Article 5 refers to methodological issues for 
calculating national GHG inventories, to be 
established at the first COP/moP. Because 
the emissions reduction targets are for a 
basket of gases, the global warming potentials 
(GWPs) used to convert emissions into 
carbon dioxide equivalents are critical. For 
the first commitment period, the IPCC 
guidelines accepted in 1997 will be used, 
although these may be updated for future 
commitment periods. 
Communication 
Annex I Parties must submit additional 
information in their national communication 
to verify compliance with Article 3 of the 
Protocol (Article 7). Guidelines for this 
information must be formulated by the 
COP/moP. Article 8 calls for an expert review 
of national communications from Annex I 
Parties, particularly the information relevant 
to ensure compliance with the Convention. 
Expert teams would carry out these reviews 
as they did for the reviews of 
communications under the Convention. Note 
that this process does not apply to 
communications from developing countries 
(non-Annex I Parties). 
Dispute resolution and non-
compliance 
Articles 16 and 18 form the legal basis for 
addressing non-compliance issues. They give 
the first COP/moP a clear mandate to 
approve, at its first session appropriate and 
effective measures to address non-
compliance. This process may build the 
development of a multilateral consultative 
process under Article 13 on the FCCC, which 
has still not been completed. 
Review of adequacy of 
commitments 
Article 9 requires that the COP/moP 
periodically review the adequacy of 
commitments in the Protocol, given that the 
commitments in Annex B will not come close 
to achieving the overall objective of the 
FCCC. These reviews will be based on the 
best available scientific information. The first 
review will take place at COP 5 in 1999. 
International legal issues 
As with the UNFCCC, the later Articles of the 
Protocol lay out the international legal 
framework for amending, updating, and 
bringing the Convention into force. All 
decisions should be made by consensus 
wherever possible, but failing that, 
amendments to the Protocol and the 
Annexes can be made by three-fourths vote 
(Article 20 and 21). Annex B can only be 
amended with the explicit consent of the 
Party concerned. Parties can choose not to 
accept amendments if they notify the 
Secretariat. Each Party has one vote in all 
decisions, except where a regional economic 
integration organisation votes as a bloc, in 
which case they have as many votes as they 
have member states (Article 22). 
The Protocol was open for signature from 
March 1998 to March 1999, and thereafter 
opened for ratification, with Parties 
depositing their instruments of ratification 
with the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (Articles 23, 24). 
The Protocol enters into force 90 days after 
the fiftieth country has ratified, as long as the 
Parties that have ratified account for 55% of 
total Annex I carbon dioxide emissions for 
1990 (Article 25). This means that the US 
(36% of 1990 emissions) and Russia 
(17.4%), for example, could veto the 
Protocol. 
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Criteria 
Consistency 
Credit Unit 
Objectives 
Parties 
I ~mplementatio 
I Banking 
! Sinks i 
!
j Adaptation 
levy 
Bubbling 
Assigned 
amounts 
Meet joint 
commitments 
Annex B 
Multilateral 
No 
N/a 
No 
Jl COM ET 
Emissions Certified Assigned 
amounts reduction units Emissions 
Emissions 
reductions 
Annex I 
Bilateral 
No 
Yes 
No 
Reductions 
Sustainable Emissions 
development & reductions 
emissions 
reductions 
All 
Bilateral & 
multilateral 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Annex B 
? 
No 
N/a 
No 
Table 1. Comparison of flexibility mechanisms 
Annex B 
Party Quantified emissions Party Quantified emissions limitation or 
limitation or reduction reduction commitment (% of base 
commitment (% of base year year or period) 
or period) 
Australia 108 Latvia 92 
Austria 92 Liechtenstein 92 
Belgium 92 Lithuania 92 
Bulgaria 92 Luxembourg 92 
Canada 94 Monaco 92 
Croatia 95 Netherlands 92 
Czech Republic 92 New Zealand 100 
Denmark 92 Norway 101 
Estonia 92 Poland 94 
European EC 92 Portugal 92 
Finland 92 Romania 92 
France 92 Russian Fed. 100 
Germany 92 Slovakia 92 
Greece 92 Spain 92 
Hungary 94 Sweden 92 
Iceland 110 Switzerland 92 
Ireland 92 Ukraine 100 
Italy 92 United Kingdom 92 
Japan 94 USA 93 
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The United Nations process 
This document provides an overview of the 
process that produced both the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(FCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol. While the 
process has a relatively short history (the 
Framework Convention was negotiated in 15 
months, and the Kyoto Protocol was 
negotiated in only a slightly longer 
timeframe) there were events that preceded 
the negotiations which have had a lasting 
impact on the climate change negotiating 
process. 
This document also looks at some of the key 
issues and themes that have developed under 
the climate change negotiations and that will 
be dealt with in the years to come. 
Developing consensus for action 
Environmental issues first gained 
international prominence at the 1972 UN 
Conference on Human Environment 
(UNCHE) held in Stockholm, Sweden. Up 
until that time there were no international 
arenas in which countries could raise 
environmental issues. Following the UNCHE, 
the scientific community began to place more 
emphasis on international environmental 
issues, including climate change. As interest 
in and scientific data on climate change 
increased, policy-makers also began to focus 
on this issue. 
In the case of the FCCC, there were many 
contributing factors leading up to the signing 
of the Convention at the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 
Rio de Janiero, Brazil in 1992. Listed below 
are only a few highlights: 
• The UN Environment Programme 
(UNEP) was created at the UNCHE. 
• In 1979, the World Meteorological 
Organisation held a World Climate 
Conference. This was one of the first 
scientific conferences that looked at 
climate change as a serious environmental 
problem. It issued a declaration calling on 
the world's governments 'to foresee and 
prevent potential man-made changes in 
climate that might be adverse to the well-
being of humanity'. 
• In 1983, the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) established the World 
Commission on Environment and 
Development. This led to the 1987 report 
'Our Common Future', more commonly 
known as the Brundtland Report. This 
report developed the theme of sustainable 
development, which 'meets the needs of 
the present generation without 
compromtsmg the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.' 
• In 1988, the WMO and UNEP established 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) to develop a coordinated 
scientific assessment of the problem and 
possible responses. In 1990, it produced 
the report 'Climate change: The IPCC 
scientific assessment.' 
• In 1988, the UNGA adopted a resolution 
recognising climate change as a 'common 
concern of mankind.' It also endorsed the 
establishment of the IPCC. 
• In 1989, the UNGA decided to convene 
the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development, giving climate change a 
high priority. UNGA Resolution 44/207 
also highlighted concerns of developing 
countries and of low-lying island states. 
• The Second World Climate Conference 
was held in 1990, and called for a 
framework treaty on climate change. 
Although international targets were 
discussed, no agreement was reached. 
There was general support for principles, 
many of which were later included in the 
FCCC. These included: climate change as 
a common concern of humankind; the 
importance of equity; the common but 
differentiated responsibilities of countries 
at different levels of development; 
sustainable development; and the 
precautionary principle that lack of full 
scientific certainty should not be used as 
an excuse to postpone action when there 
is a threat of serious or irreversible 
damage. 
• The Alliance of Small Island States was 
forrned at this conference. 
• In 1990, the UNGA adopted a resolution 
establishing the Intergovernmental Negot-
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iating Committee (INC) to negotiate a 
convention on climate change. This 
negotiation was to be completed in time 
for a Convention to be signed at the 
UNCED in June 1992. 
• The FCCC was adopted in May 1992 . 
In June 1992, the UNCED was convened in 
Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. One hundred and 
seventy eight countries attended the 
conference. as did more than 100 heads of 
state and more than 1 000 non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). In addition to the 
FCCC, four major instruments were signed at 
UNCED: 
• the Rio Declaration (a statement of 
principles); 
• Agenda 21 (a document identifying 
priority actions and guidelines for their 
achievement, it also created the 
Commission on Sustainable 
Development); 
• a Framework Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD); and 
• a Statement of Principles on Forests. 
The UN negotiating process 
International environmental agreements are 
generally negotiated through 
intergovernmental negotiating committees 
(INC). INCs have either been under the 
auspices of the UN General Assembly or the 
UN Environment Programme (UNEP). For 
example, although the FCCC and CBD were 
both signed at the UNCED, they went 
through separate negotiating processes. The 
FCCC was negotiated through an INC 
established by the UNGA, and relied on the 
work of the IPCC. The CBD was negotiated 
through an INC that subsumed the UNEP Ad 
hoc Working Group on Biological Diversity. 
UN Conventions: Climate Change and 
I 
Desertification. 
UNEP Conventions: Basel, Biodiversity, 
CITES, Migratory Species, and the 
Montreal Protocol 
The INC/FCCC negotiating 
process 
In 1990, the UNEP and WMO established an 
intergovernmental working group in response 
to calls from numerous international 
conferences for a treaty on climate change. 
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At the first meeting of the group, they called 
for the negotiations to take place under a 
single forum. At the same time, some 
developing countries were concerned that a 
negotiating forum under the auspices of the 
UNEP and WMO might limit their 
participation and focus on purely technical 
issues. Developing countries felt that the 
treaty should consider environment and 
development equally. The UNGA responded 
by placing the INC under its auspices (UNGA 
resolution 45/212). The INC for a Framework 
Convention on Climate Change was to 
complete negotiations in time for a signing at 
the UNCED. 
Between February 1991 and May 1992, five 
INC sessions were held, culminating in the 
FCCC's adoption on 9 May 1992. Some 150 
states and numerous intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organizations participated 
in these sessions. The IPCCs First Assessment 
Report served as the scientific basis for the 
INC's work, as did products from 
international meetings such as the Second 
World Climate Conference. At the INC's first 
session, two working groups were 
established. The groups met in parallel and 
submitted draft treaty elements to the 
plenary. Working Group I focused on issues 
relating to commitments (limiting and 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions; 
protecting and enhancing sinks and 
reservoirs; financial mechanisms; technology 
transfer; and 'common but differentiated' 
responsibilities of developed and developing 
countries). Working Group II focused on legal 
and institutional mechanisms. 
There was disagreement on many issu~s. 
One key issue was how binding commitments 
should be dealt with, and therefore how the 
agreement should be structured. There were 
two basic models that the negotiators 
considered. The first was a framework that 
dealt with issues comprehensively (including 
specific targets and timetables) and the 
second was a step-by-step approach whereby 
a framework agreement with general 
obligations could be followed up by a more 
comprehensive protocol or other legal 
instrument. Because negotiations of a 
comprehensive agreement could prove to be 
difficult and would likely limit participation 
(by countries choosing not to ratify), the INC 
chose to produce a consensus document. 
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The FCCC was signed by 154 states (plus the 
EC) at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 
June 1992. The Convention entered into 
force on 21 March 1993, 90 days after the 
receipt of the 50th instrument of ratification 
(after signing a convention a state must also 
ratify in order to become a Party to the 
agreement). 
Following adoption of the Convention, and 
up until the first Conference of the Parties 
(COP), the INC continued to meet. The 
purpose of these interim sessions was to 
make progress on unresolved issues, 
elaborate and implement the reporting and 
review processes and consider next steps 
beyond the FCCC. 
Six sessions of the INC were held between 
March 1993 and February 1995. At INC 6, 
negotiators identified tasks that were specified 
in the Convention for which some type of 
action was needed by the COP at its first 
session. INC 6 also decided that these tasks 
would form a large part of its work in 
preparing for COP 1. 
The next five INC sessions (INC 7-11) began 
working on the issues identified by INC 6. 
These included: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
designing methodologies for calculations 
and inventories of emissions and 
removals of greenhouse gases; 
implementing Article 11 (the Financial 
Mechanism) and the interim 
arrangements under Article 21.3 (the 
Global Environment Facility as the 
interim financial mechanism); 
preparing for the first review of 
information communicated by Annex I 
Parties; 
designing criteria for joint 
implementation; 
designing rules of procedure of the COP 
and subsidiary bodies; 
preparing for the review of the adequacy 
of developed country commitments 
contained in Article 4.2(a) and (b); and 
designing provisions for a permanent 
Secretariat. 
Following the tenth session of the INC, 
AOSIS submitted a draft protocol that called 
for at least a 20% reduction in C02 emissions 
by the year 2005 by Annex I Parties. 
The negotiating process under 
the Convention 
1£ 
The COP is the supreme decision-making 
body of a Convention and is comprised of all 
states that have ratified it. The specific 
function of the COP may vary from 
Convention to Convention depending on the 
issues covered. 
The COP of the FCCC is responsible for the 
regular review of the implementation of the 
Convention and for taking necessary 
decisions, within its mandate to promote the 
effective implementation of the Convention. 
It is to meet annually, unless otherwise 
decided by the Parties. 
In the case of the Kyoto Protocol, it is the 
Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties (COP/moP) that is the 
supreme decision-making body. The 
distinction between the two is that Parties to 
the COP that are not Parties to the Protocol 
can only participate as observers, and that 
decisions under the Protocol are taken only 
by Parties to the Protocol. 
Other Protocols, such as the Montreal 
Protocol on Substances that Deplete the 
Ozone Layer, have established the Meeting 
of the Parties (moP) as the supreme 
decision-making body. There is not 
substantive difference, however, between a 
moP and COP. 
Most environmental agreements provide the 
COP the ability to establish any subsidiary 
bodies it may deem necessary to assist it in 
carrying out its duties. Some Conventions 
have chosen to have working groups instead 
of subsidiary bodies. As with the moP and 
COP, there is not necessarily a substantive 
difference between a subsidiary body and a 
working group. The number of subsidiary 
bodies and their functions vary by 
agreement. 
The FCCC established two permanent 
subsidiary bodies: 
• The Subsidiary Body for Scientific 
and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
(FCCC Article 9) 
Its primary function is to provide timely 
information and advice on scientific and 
technological matters related to the 
Convention. Issues covered by SBSTA 
include development and transfer of 
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technology, 
observation, 
forestry. 
research and 
and land-use 
• The Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI) 
systematic 
change and 
Article 10 of the FCCC states that the SBI is 
to 'assist the Conference of the Parties in the 
assessment and review of the effective 
implementation of the Convention'. Issues 
covered by SBI include national 
communications, the review of the adequacy 
of commitments, and administrative and 
financial matters. Some issues, such as the 
AIJ pilot phase and the Kyoto mechanisms 
have been allocated to both SBI and SBST A. 
Article 7.2(i) of the FCCC allows the COP to 
establish other subsidiary bodies 'as are 
deemed necessary for the implementation of 
the Convention'. To date, two additional 
bodies have been established: the Ad Hoc 
Group on the Berlin Mandate (AGBM) and 
the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 (AG-13). 
The AGBM was tasked with negotiating a 
protocol or other type of legal instrument. 
The AG-13 was tasked with studying issues 
related to the establishment of a multilateral 
consultative process. The AGBM expired 
once the negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol 
were completed. 
The financial mechanism 
In order to assist developing countries in 
implementing the Convention, a financial 
mechanism was established (Article 11). As 
stated in the Article, the financial mechanism 
is to provide 'financial resources on a grant 
or concessional basis, including for the 
transfer of technology' to developing 
countries. Its role is to transfer funds and 
technology to developing countries. The 
financial mechanism is guided by and 
accountable to the COP, which decides its 
policies, program priorities and eligibility 
criteria. 
The financial mechanism has been a major 
area of contention throughout the climate 
negotiations. During the early INC 
negotiations, most developed countries 
wanted to give the Global Environment 
Facility the responsibility for the financial 
mechanism. The GEF was launched in 1990 
with the World Bank, the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), and 
UNEP as the implementing agencies. The 
1:5 
funds available through the GEF are based 
on voluntary contributions from OECD 
countries. Developing countries had concerns 
about using the GEF as the financial 
mechanism since it was dominated by donor 
countries at that time. The GEF was chosen 
as an interim financial mechanism, and was 
restructured in 1994 to address non -Annex I 
country concerns. Projects funded by the 
GEF should be cost-effective, support 
national development priorities and focus on 
enabling activities. 
Issues and themes 
The Convention sets out several general 
principles. These include the importance of 
promoting sustainable development, the 
special needs of developing countries, the 
'precautionary principle' that says the lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as 
an excuse to postpone action, the principle of 
'common but differentiated responsibilities'. 
and the principle of 'equity'. 
• Equity: 
The issue of equity has been present 
throughout the climate change debate. 
During the UNCED and early INC processes. 
developing countries felt that development 
must be given equal consideration to the 
environment, particularly given the different 
levels of industrialization. Equity is imbedded 
in several principles under the Convention. 
Because historical and current emissions 
originate from industrialised countries, these 
countries have a large share of the 
responsibility for addressing climate change. 
The Convention also recognises the right of 
less-industrialised countries to economic 
development, and acknowledges the 
vulnerability of these countries to the effects 
of climate change. 
• Common but differentiated 
responsibilities: 
All Parties have some common commitments 
under the Convention. These mainly pertain 
to reporting requirements for national 
communications and greenhouse gas 
inventories. Other commitments include 
adoption of national programmes for 
mitigating climate change and development 
of strategies for adapting to its impacts. The 
Convention recognises, however, that 
industrialised countries have been 
predominantly responsible for human-
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induced climate change, and that they are in 
a better position to take action. Therefore, 
industrialised countries listed in Annex I of 
the FCCC are committed to adopting policies 
and measures aimed at returning their 
greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 
the year 2000. Annex II countries, mainly 
those in the OECD (excluding Mexico and 
Korea) are to provide new and additional 
financial resources and facilitate technology 
transfer. 
The concepts of Joint Implementation and 
Emissions Trading were introduced by and of 
great interest to Annex I countries. Joint 
Implementation is provided for in the 
Convention, while emissions trading was 
introduced during the process leading up to 
Kyoto. 
• Joint Implementation: 
Article 4.2(a) of the Convention states that 
Parties 'may implement such policies and 
measures jointly with other Parties and may 
assist other Parties in contributing to the 
achievement of the objective of the 
Convention'. Article 4.2(b) contains a 
reference to the aim of returning GHG 
emissions to 1990 levels either 'individually 
or jointly'. Taken together, this is the basis for 
joint implementation under the Convention. 
There was a great deal of debate about 
whether non-Annex I countries could or 
should participate. Generally, Annex I 
countries felt that projects could be 
undertaken jointly by Annex I and non-
Annex I countries. Non-Annex I countries felt 
that the concept did not apply to them. The 
concept of crediting emissions reduced or 
sequestered from these projects also caused a 
great deal of concern since only Annex I 
countries were obligated to try to reduce their 
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000. 
Another major concern for non-Annex I 
countries was that joint implementation 
would reduce the amount of funds available 
for development assistance. During COP 1, a 
compromise was reached in which the pilot 
phase Activities Implemented Jointly was 
launched. It allowed for non-Annex I 
participation on a voluntary basis, with no 
crediting, and that funds would have to be 
additional to ODA. 
• Emissions trading: 
This was introduced by the United States 
during the AGBM process. During COP 2, 
14 
the US stated that flexibility instruments 
(meaning the market-based mechanisms that 
were later incorporated into the Kyoto 
Protocol) were a prerequisite for accepting 
binding commitments. These mechanisms 
were based on the principle that 'policies and 
measures to deal with climate change should 
be cost-effective so as to ensure global 
benefits at the lowest possible cost' (Article 
3.3). Under an international trading system. a 
country (or firm) would be able to meet its 
emissions reduction target by reducing 
pollution itself, purchasing reductions from 
another country (or firm) that was able to 
achieve excess gains, or some combination of 
both. This concept faced strong opposition 
by some developing countries and 
environmental organisations. They were 
concerned that emissions trading would be 
used as a way for industrialised countries. 
particularly the US, to buy their way out of 
meeting their commitment instead of taking 
actions at home. Many Annex I Parties 
initially responded with caution since there is 
very little international experience with 
emissions trading. 
Highlights from the Conference 
of the Parties 
The Conference of the Parties at its first 
session responded to a review of the 
adequacy of developed country 
commitments by issuing the Berlin Mandate. 
Most Parties agreed that the commitments 
contained in the FCCC were not adequate. 
and that negotiations should begin on a 
Protocol or type of other legal instrument. 
The Berlin Mandate called on Parties to 
conclude negotiations of a legal instrument in 
time for adoption at the third session of the 
COP. The Mandate set as a priority the 
establishment of quantified em1ss1ons 
reductions and limitation objectives (or 
targets) within a specified timeframe for 
Annex I Parties. The new instrument was also 
to reaffirm existing commitments for all 
Parties while not introducing new 
commitments for non-Annex I Parties. 
The Berlin Mandate also established an 
open-ended working group to negotiate the 
new instrument, the Ad Hoc Group on the 
Berlin Mandate (AGBM). 
COP 1 aimed to address criteria for joint 
implementation. This had been a highly 
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controversial concept throughout the 
negotiating process. As a compromise, 
Activities Implemented Jointly under the pilot 
phase was established (see issues and themes 
for more information). 
The IPCC's Second Assessment Report was 
released in late 1995. It concluded that the 
balance of evidence suggests that there is a 
discernible human influence on global 
climate. 
COP 2 issued the Geneva Declaration. 
Although somewhat controversial, most 
countries supported the Declaration. The 
Declaration strongly endorsed the conclusion 
of the lPCC's Second Assessment Report, 
accepted the IPCC's assertion that the 
continued rise in atmospheric concentrations 
of heat-trapping gases 'will lead to dangerous 
interference with the climate system', and 
called on negotiators to complete a binding 
protocol that included binding targets and 
timetables. 
In December 1997, the third session of the 
COP met and reached agreement on the 
Kyoto Protocol. The Protocol includes an 
overall emissions target of at least 5% for 
1!:> 
developed nations, with individual countries 
taking on different binding targets based on 
their economic and national situations, i.e., 
8% below 1990 emissions levels for the 
European Union; 7% for the United States· 
and 6% for Japan. The Protocol also include~ 
market-based measures the Kyoto 
mechanisms of international emissions 
trading (Article 17), Article 6 on project-based 
activities between developed countries (Joint 
Implementation) and the Clean Development 
Mechanism (Article 12). 
The fourth session of the COP focused on 
issues related to strengthening the 
implementation of the Convention and 
preparing for the entry into force of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Parties adopted the Buenos Aires 
Plan of Action which focused on the 
Financial Mechanism, technology transfer 
and development, implementation of Article 
4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention, the review 
process of the AIJ pilot phase, and the 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol. Other 
developments at COP-4 included the 
announcement by Argentina and Kazakhstan 
of their willingness to take on voluntary 
commitments to limit their emissions. 
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Implications of climate change and international climate 
change agreements for South Africa 
Background 
Human-induced climate change arose as an 
issue of international concern in the early 
1970s. A series of conferences and research 
reports highlighted the significance of the 
potential problem, prompting an 
international response to the issue of climate 
change. In 1988 the Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change (IPCC) was established 
to develop a scientific assessment of the 
problem and possible responses. While there 
is a level of uncertainty around the extent of 
human-induced climate change, the IPCC 
concluded that the balance of evidence 
suggests a discernible human influence on 
global climate. 
Human-induced climate change could 
adversely affect economies and the impacts 
are likely to vary on a regional basis. Africa, 
for example, could face a range of threats, 
including more frequent and extreme floods 
and landslides, strong winds, droughts, tidal 
waves, the spread of malaria, destruction of 
wild life and disrupted water supplies and 
agriculture. Many physical and ecological 
systems are likely to be simultaneously 
affected, thereby slowing the ability of 
ecological systems to replenish naturally. 
For South Africa, climate change models 
predict an increase in mean air temperature. 
The magnitude of the increase is however 
' ' 
uncertain, with estimates ranging between a 
1 ac and 3.5°C increase over the next 
century, with 2°C most likely. The 
temperature increase is expected to be 
greater at night than during the day and 
greater in winter than in summer. It is likely 
that the average rainfall will change, but it 
could increase in some parts of the country, 
and decrease in other parts: there is an 
indication that areas in the interior (such as 
the Highveld and Kalahari Basin) may 
become drier. The winter rainfall region of 
the southern and western Cape could get 
more summer rain. 
In response to the growing international 
concern with regard to the possible impacts 
of climate change, the United Nations 
Framework Convention (UNFCCC) was 
negotiated and finally adopted in 1992. 
The fourth session of the Conference of the 
Parties (COP4) to the UNFCCC held in 
Buenos Aires in November 1998 is one of a 
series of UNFCCC COPs held since 1995. 
The Buenos Aires meeting, in particular, built 
on the Kyoto Protocol adopted in December 
1997 in Japan. The Kyoto Protocol 
represented the first step in an effort to cut 
down human-induced greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere. Under the 
Kyoto Protocol, 38 industrialised countries 
agreed to legally binding commitments to 
reduce their emissions to, on average, S<ro 
below 1990 levels by the year 2012. 
South Africa became a signatory to the 
UNFCCC in June 1993. After a series of 
delays, ratification of the Convention took 
place in August 1997. Administration of the 
UNFCCC in South Africa is the responsibility· 
of the Department of Environment and 
Tourism (DEAT), but the effects of climate 
change and climate change response 
measures are felt in a range of different 
economic sectors and, therefore, co-
operation between government departments 
is required. 
Prior to ratification of the Convention the 
South African government was abl~ to 
participate in the international climate change 
only negotiations as an observer. South 
Africa's active involvement in the 
negotiations has, therefore, been relatively 
short and its progression in terms of 
investigating the implications of climate 
change and climate change response 
measures relatively limited. The South 
African Country Studies Programme should 
shed new light on the vulnerability of South 
Africa to climate change and is expected to 
be completed in 1999. 
International agreements on climate change 
(the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol) create 
an opportunity for South Africa to cooperate 
with other countries to mitigate climate 
greenhouse gas emissions through joint 
projects. Climate change joint projects could 
bring investment opportunities that, if 
correctly framed, could positively affect the 
economy. 
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South Africa must be proactive in 
climate change debates 
Decisions and agreements taken in 
international meetings such as the 
Conference of the Parties to the FCCC have 
far-reaching consequences for both Annex I 
and non-Annex I nations. 
South Africa forms part of the African 
regional block that contributes around 3% of 
the global emissions, an almost negligible 
share. However, South Africa is by far the 
largest emitter of C02 in Africa, as it is an 
energy-intensive economy which relies 
heavily on coal for energy production. 
Although South Africa is unlikely to be faced 
with binding commitments to reduce its 
emissions of GHGs in the near future, if 
differentiation is made within the non-Annex 
I (developing) country category in the future, 
it is not improbable that South Africa could 
face some intermediate targets by virtue of its 
relatively high levels of income and 
emissions. Thus it is important that South 
African policy making takes explicit account 
of the climate change issue and adopts a 
proactive stance in international negotiations. 
As a signatory to the UNFCCC and a non-
Annex I Party, South Africa can participate in 
joint climate change projects which work 
toward achieving sustainable development. 
South Africa could play a leading role in 
climate change issues in Africa. To achieve 
this, it first needs to build capacity within 
government to understand the climate 
change negotiations and key issues and to 
implement climate change policy. South 
Africa should seize the opportunity for no-
regrets options to combat climate change 
threats: options which are economically 
viable and beneficial to the country 
irrespective of whether climate change is a 
reality, and irrespective of the outcome of the 
climate change negotiations. Such an 
undertaking could benefit South Africa 
immensely for future readiness and possible 
commitments to GHG emission reduction. 
Vulnerability to the impacts of 
climate change3 
1 { 
With the growth in atmospheric concen-
trations of greenhouse gases, interference 
with the climate system will grow in 
magnitude, and the likelihood of adverse 
impacts from climate change that could 
be judged dangerous will become 
greater. (IPCC 1995) 
The most vulnerable ecological and socio-
economic systems are those with the greatest 
sensitivity to climate change and the least 
ability to adapt. Sensitivity is the degree to 
which a system will respond to a change in 
climatic conditions and adaptability is the 
degree to which systems can adjust in 
response to, or in anticipation of, changed 
conditions. Vulnerability defines the extent to 
which climate change may damage or harm 
a system and is dependent not only on the 
systems sensitivity, but on its ability to adapt. 
Socio-economic systems tend to be more 
vulnerable in developing countries with 
weaker economies and institutions. It follows 
that developing countries are likely to be the 
hardest hit economically by climate change. 
South Africa's vulnerability to climate change 
can be partially gauged by analysing the way 
in which people have responded to 
unaccustomed weather conditions in the 
past. Drought, for example, had serious 
impacts on South Africa's staple food supply 
industry in the early 1980s. Other climatic 
events, such as tornadoes, floods and storms, 
have also had serious socio-economic 
impacts, particularly in poorer communities. 
Going by responses to climate-related crises 
in the past, it can be concluded that the 
impacts of climate change on South Africa 
might be significant. 
The challenge for policy-makers is to 
formulate appropriate and cost-effective 
strategies at a time when the scientific 
methodology of ascertaining and accurately 
modeling climate change impacts is still in its 
embryonic stage. In South Africa, there is 
currently a lack of data to determine the real 
impacts of climate change, although 
This section relies heavily on two main sources: 
lPCC ( 1995) IPCC Second Assessment: Climate 
Change 1995 and DEAT (1998) Climate 
Change Policy Discussion Document. 
.. 
.. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
(.;llmate change onet~ngs 
international models indicate that southern 
Africa could be one of the hardest hit regions. 
An assessment of the impact of natural events 
occurring in South Africa will aid us in 
determining the most vulnerable groups and 
sectors in South Africa, which in tum will 
make it easier to find adaptation strategies 
and policies to reduce the impacts of future 
weather events resulting from climate change. 
Given the limited data on the impacts of 
climate change, South Africa's Climate 
Change Policy Discussion Document 
identifies the following as the most important 
areas for concern: agriculture and forestry, 
water resources, health, the coastal zone and 
biodiversity. 
Agricultural and pastoral sectors 
As projections on regional climate change are 
still uncertain, so too are projections of the 
resulting agricultural and pastoral impacts. 
While global agricultural production is 
expected to be maintained relative to 
predicted baseline levels over the next 100 
years, IPCC analysis suggests that the impact 
on productivity and crop yields will vary 
considerably between regions, with some 
agricultural regions being threatened by 
climate change and others benefiting. 
The IPCC identify the following potential 
threats and advantages of climate change: 
• Both evaporation and precipitation will 
increase, as will the frequency of intense 
rainfalls. While some regions might 
become wetter, in others the net effect of 
an intensified hydrological cycle will be a 
loss of soil moisture. Some regions that 
are already drought prone may suffer 
longer and more severe dry spells. 
• Some crops might be damaged by higher 
temperatures, particularly if water 
shortages obtain. 
• Insects and plant diseases may expand 
polewards, adding to the risk of crop loss. 
• The increase in C02 which, in part, 
causes climate change. may stimulate 
growth in certain plants, such as wheat, 
barley, cassava and potato; and make 
them more water-efficient. This effect 
could be enhanced or reduced by 
accompanying changes in temperature, 
precipitation, pests and the availability of 
nutrients. The effect will not be as 
11:1 
dramatic in other plants, such as maize, 
sugar cane, sorghum and millet. 
pasturage and forage grasses. 
• The effects of climate change on marine 
fisheries will be felt at the national and 
local levels as people respond to the 
change in species-mix by relocating 
fisheries. 
Although agriculture is not South Africa·s 
largest economic sector, it is important. 
Despite two-thirds of the country falling 
below the rainfall limit for reliable wheat and 
maize crops, South Africa is self-sufficient in 
food, except during periods of widespread 
drought. On a national level, it is estimated 
that a 10% increase in rainfall coupled with 
an increase in C02 would lead to a 10-20a-o 
increase in wheat and maize production. 
while a 10% decrease in rainfall would be 
approximately balanced by the rising C02 
content of the atmosphere. Slightly warmer 
temperatures may lead to a small reduction 
in wheat yields, but would have little effect on 
maize. These predictions are, however, nor 
certain and do not take into account the local 
impacts of climate change in the different 
regions of the country. 
Some regions and groups are likely to be 
more vulnerable to climate change than 
others. Particularly vulnerable are those. 
predominantly the poor, who practice 
subsistence farming. Subsistence farmers are 
often farming already marginal land and are 
slow to adapt to changes because they lack 
the resources to do so. 
The impacts of El Nino have been felt in 
South Africa in recent years. Within scientific 
and meteorology circles, there are concerns 
that global warming could lead to a stronger 
and even more frequent El Nino effect. 
Bearing in mind the significant impact that 
this phenomenon had in the early 1980s in 
South Africa and many parts of Africa, the 
impact of climate change on South Africa 
may be more severe than expected. 
IPCC scientific analysis suggests that the 
productivity of rangelands and pastures will 
also be affected by climate change. While 
intensively managed livestock systems are 
likely to adapt more easily to climate change 
than crop systems, the same may not be the 
case in pastoral systems, where communities 
tend to adopt new methods and technologies 
more slowly. 
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Much of South Africa, especially the drier 
parts, is used for grazing cattle, sheep and 
wildlife. Higher C02 will lead to less protein 
in the grass, which would reduce any benefit 
resulting from increased plant growth. Less 
rainfall would lead to proportionately less 
animal production. 
Forestry 
The impact of climate change will be 
experienced both in the commercial forestry 
sector and by those using wood for fuel. 
South Africa's climate already limits the 
extent of both its plantation and indigenous 
forests. Commercial plantations are further 
limited by the need to conserve water. The 
forestry industry could probably tolerate a 
small increase in temperature, but a decrease 
in rainfall would reduce the area which can 
support plantations, and the growth rate of 
trees. Rising carbon dioxide could, however, 
help reduce the amount of water used by 
pine and gum plantations. 
Indigenous forests will also be susceptible to 
these climatic changes. Forest die-back due 
to drought, insects and disease may increase, 
especially in regions where rain becomes 
scarce. 
An increase in summer droughts could also 
increase the risk of forest fires, especially 
where forests are already under stress from 
current human activities like slash-and-bums. 
At risk are recreational activities and wild life 
habitat. 
Forest decline in South Africa's rural areas 
not only threatens biodiversity, but also 
energy security. Most rural communities still 
rely on biomass as their means of meeting 
their energy requirements, even after 
electrification. 
Forests are also a source of medicines for 
many rural communities in South Africa and 
pressure on these valuable natural resources 
could, therefore, negatively impact these 
communities. 
Water resources 
IPCC analysis indicates that, on a global 
level, climate change will lead to more 
precipitation, but also more evaporation. 
While some regions are likely to receive 
increases and others decreases in 
precipitation, the complexity of the 
hydrological cycle makes it difficult to 
accurately predict the regional variations. The 
1~ 
following threats to water resources are 
identified: 
• Several climate change models suggest 
that downpours will become more 
intense in future. This will increase floods 
and run-off, but reduce infiltration . 
• Changes in seasonal patterns of 
precipitation may affect the regional 
distribution of both ground and surface 
water supplies. 
• Relatively small changes in temperature 
and precipitation could cause relative 
large changes in run-off and, therefore, 
arid and semi-arid regions will be 
particularly sensitive to reduced rainfall 
and to increased evaporation and plant 
transpiration. 
South Africa's rainfall is patchy in distribution 
and variable from year to year, with much of 
the country being arid or semi-arid in nature. 
These areas are susceptible to both droughts 
and floods. 
Even without climate change, South Africa is 
predicted to exhaust its surface water 
resources by early next century. A reduction 
in rainfall amount or reliability, or an increase 
in evaporation (due to higher temperatures) 
would make this situation worse. Increased 
evaporation could affect water supply and 
quality. Intensive rainfall could increase flood 
frequency and magnitude, affecting both crop 
yields and drinking water quality. 
South Africa's industrial, domestic and 
agricultural users depend on a reliable water 
supply. The economic consequences of 
changing water availability will inevitably 
affect water pricing and crop production and 
thus need to be explored at both physical 
and policy levels. Water-supply infrastructure 
takes years to develop and is designed to last 
decades; water resource planners need to 
take into account the possibility of climate 
change when planning future infrastructure. 
This task is complicated by the fact that 
climate models are not able to accurately 
predict regional changes in precipitation. 
There are limited wetlands in South Africa 
and such areas could be greatly affected if 
inland fresh water is threatened. At risk could 
be habitats of migratory birds and other 
species. Equally vulnerable are coastal 
wetlands as a result of sea level rise. 
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Health 
The links between human health and climate 
change could be both direct and indirect. 
Possible direct health effects include 
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, 
injuries, psychological disorders and deaths 
resulting from a greater intensity and duration 
of heat waves and floods, storms and other 
extreme climate events. Indirect health effects 
could include increased respiratory effects 
such as asthma, water-borne diseases and 
vector-borne diseases such as malaria. 
Studies have shown a clear relationship 
between allergen-producing organisms -
such as plants, mould and house dust mites -
and climatic factors such as humidity, 
temperature. rainfall and sunshine. 
The geographic range and life-cycle of 
pathogens and vectors which transmit 
diseases are affected by climatic conditions. 
Climate change would, on aggregate, 
increase the potential transmission of many 
vector-borne diseases and potentially lead to 
increases in diseases such as malaria. 
Currently, malarial mosquitoes in South 
Africa are confined to the warm, moist parts. 
A small increase in the average temperature 
could allow malaria to spread, and increase 
the severity in areas where it already occurs. 
This has implications for health costs. 
Climate change is likely to have greater 
health and economic impacts on developing 
nations than on rich ones. Two factors lead 
to this conclusion. First, communities in 
developing countries are forced to live on 
marginal land and lack capacity or resources 
to adapt to change. For example, flooding by 
the Mississippi river in 1993 brought few 
disruptions while a similar flooding incident 
in Kwazulu-Natal claimed a number of lives 
and caused massive disruptions in food 
supply, widespread disease and economic 
dislocation for some time. Rural communities 
with limited infrastructure (such as access 
roads) and resources are most vulnerable. If 
climate change increases the frequency of 
very hot days, the result might be increased 
cardiovascular and respiratory related deaths. 
More frequent occurrences of such incidences 
will incur costs for the health sector. 
The coastal zone 
As water in the oceans warms up it expands, 
resulting in an increase in mean sea level. 
This thermal expansion, together with an 
influx of fresh water from melting glaciers and 
:.!U 
ice, could result in a sea-level rise of between 
15 and 95 centimetres by 2100. The rate and 
magnitude of the sea-level rise will vary 
locally and regionally in response to coastline 
features, changes in ocean currents and 
differences in tidal patterns and sea-water 
density. The following may result from sea-
level rise: 
• Coastal infrastructure, such as harbours. 
beach-front buildings and roads could be 
damaged. 
• Key economic sectors, including fisheries, 
aquaculture, coastal agriculture and 
tourism, could be negatively affected. 
• Increased flooding and erosion of 
estuaries, coastal dunes and beaches 
could occur. 
While South Africa's coastline is relatively 
steep and, therefore, the consequences of a 
small sea-level rise is not expected to be 
extensive; areas already prone to flooding 
and tidal storm damage will be more 
susceptible if the sea-level rises. 
Biodiversity 
The climate changes resulting from human 
activities predicted for the next century are 
approximately of the same magnitude as the 
natural climate changes that accompanied 
the ice ages in the past. Human-induced 
climate change will, however, take place over 
a much shorter period of time. Plants, in 
particular, have trouble adapting to rapid 
changes in climate. South Africa has about 
10% of the plant species in the world, half of 
these occur nowhere else. Warming, and a 
change in the season in which rain falls in the 
Cape Floral Kingdom, are issues of concern 
for the maintenance of this rich biodiversity. 
Human activity already threatens biodiversity 
- by, for example, fragmenting ecosystems 
and creating isolated populations which are 
less able to adapt. These isolated populations 
are most vulnerable to climate change and 
could become extinct as a result. 
Impact of policies to mitigate 
climate change 
As a non-Annex I Party to the UNFCCC, 
South Africa has, at present, no commitments 
to reduce its GHG em1ss1ons. The 
implementation of mitigation policies and 
measures in industrialised countries in an 
attempt to reach their Kyoto Protocol targets 
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could, however, have impacts on certain 
economic sectors, such as energy, mining, 
and transport in South Africa. Furthermore, 
as a non-Annex I Party to the Convention, 
South Africa can, through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (COM), established 
by the Kyoto Protocol, enter into projects 
jointly with industrialised countries to reduce 
emissions. As the sectors which contribute 
most to local GHG emissions, energy, 
transport and mining are likely to be targeted 
for such joint activities. 
Energy 
The energy sector is the single largest source 
of greenhouse gases in most countries. It 
naturally follows that it would be the focus of 
GHG mitigation activities. South Africa is the 
eighteenth largest emitter of C02 in the world 
and by far the largest emitter of C02 in 
Africa. In South Africa, the energy sector 
accounts for 89% of total C02-equivalent 
emissions. 
South Africa currently has relatively cheap 
electricity and coal which provides a national 
advantage in promoting economic growth. In 
an attempt to maintain the economic 
competitiveness of South Africa's industries 
and to make electricity affordable, Eskom is 
committed to reduce the real price of 
electricity by 15% between 1993 and 2000. 
In the short term, the competitive advantage 
afforded by cheap energy could be enhanced 
if South Africa's major international 
competitors are required to use more 
expensive energy sources which emit less 
GHGs. In the longer term, however, low 
energy prices encourage wasteful energy use, 
with attendant environmental impacts. 
The impact on the energy sector of the 
international climate change agreements are 
three-fold. Firstly, the mitigation strategies 
and policies of industrialised (Annex I Parties) 
could have implications. For example, the 
Kyoto Protocol added sulphur hexafluoride, a 
gas used in switchgears in the energy sector, 
to the list of gases to be controlled. South 
Africa, as a non-Annex I country, does not 
have to limit its use of the gas, but it may 
become unavailable in the future as Annex I 
countries phase it out. 
Secondly, South Africa may be pressurised to 
reduce their own emissions in the future and 
thus implement mitigation policies and 
strategies within the energy sector. As a coal-
~1 
dependent and carbon-intensive economy, 
South Africa could come under pressure to 
accept future commitments. Already, certain 
industrialised countries such as the United 
States are putting pressure on certain 
developing economies with high total 
emissions, like India and China, to take on 
commitments. 
Thirdly, South Africa is an attractive African 
country for Annex I countries to undertake 
COM projects. Many of these are likely to be 
in the energy sector, parts of which are highly 
inefficient. For example, it has been 
estimated that, through efficiency 
improvements, energy savings of between 
20% and 50% are achievable in many 
industries at relatively low cost. 
Research shows that there are substantial 
energy efficiency improvements that can be 
made at relatively low cost - or even with 
financial benefit in the longer term. Eskom 
and energy-intensive sectors should be 
proactive in looking for no-regrets 
opportunities to reduce GHG emissions 
through energy-efficiency improvements. The 
South African government needs to balance 
the need for low-cost electricity production 
with its environmental consequences. This 
could mean investing in alternative less-
polluting sources of energy or improving the 
technology behind energy production. In the 
longer term, electricity prices could be 
adjusted to reflect the true cost of energy 
production, distribution and transmission. 
Mining 
The two main possible impacts of 
international climate change negotiations on 
the mining sector are: 
• Climate change response measure could 
result in a decrease in the international 
demand for coal. South Africa currently 
exports approximately 34% of its mined 
coal. A reduction in international 
demand for coal would have significant 
impacts on the revenue of coal mines 
and as this is a labour-intensive industry, 
couid also result in increased 
unemployment. 
• Energy-efficiency improvements in South 
Africa could result in a decreasing rate of 
growth in local demand for coal. This, 
too, could affect the viability of certain 
coal mines and could also result in job 
loss. 
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The mining sector is very energy-intensive. 
Deep mining and mineral beneficiation 
require large amounts of energy. This, 
together with the current low mineral prices, 
should provide the mining sector with an 
incentive to improve energy efficiency 
independently of the outcome of the climate 
change negotiations. The use of coal-bed 
methane as an alternative energy source is 
another possibility. 
Transport 
The transport sector accounts for 
approximately 10% of South Africa's GHG 
emissions. The high level of emissions in the 
transport sector is a result of the dominance 
of road transport, the long distances between 
places of work and residence, and the large 
distances. This sector is therefore likely to be 
a target of mitigation policies and projects -
either through the COM, or if South Africa is 
required to take on its own commitments in 
future. 
Climate change response measures, such as 
rising vehicle emissions standards and 
increased fuel costs, in industrialised 
countries could indirectly cause increased 
cost of vehicles and vehicle parts. This could 
happen for two reasons; firstly, as a result of 
South Africa trying to keep pace with 
technological advancement and, secondly, as 
a result of the fact that many vehicle 
components are imported and assembled in 
South Africa. 
The transport sector could also be affected by 
climate change through the vulnerability of 
transport infrastructure to extreme climate 
events. For example, a potential increase in 
the frequency and magnitude of flooding 
could impact on road and rail bridges and 
networks. 
Regardless of the outcome of the climate 
change negotiations, increases in vehicle 
efficiency and reduction of emissions from 
the transport sector should be carried 
forward, as transport costs are a large part of 
production and living costs in South Africa. 
Possible mitigation options include: 
promoting public transport, improving spatial 
development and road planning, and 
developing more efficient engines with lower 
emissions and less need for vehicle 
maintenance. 
Opportunities for accessing 
climate change funding 
The UNFCCC provides opportunities for 
South Africa to access funding for climate 
change activities, in terms of its commitments 
under the Convention, its adaptation needs, 
and mitigation initiatives. 
Article 11 of the Convention states that the 
financial mechanism shall provide financial 
resources on a grant or concessional basis. 
On the interim basis, the Global 
Environmental Facility (GEF) has been 
designated as the Convention's financial 
mechanism. Article 4 of the Convention 
provides that the GEF should meet the 
following costs for developing country 
parties: 
• the full costs of preparing 
communications; 
• the agreed full incremental costs of other 
developing country commitments; 
• the costs of adapting to adverse effects of 
climate change, particularly to vulnerable 
country parties. 
South Africa has already accessed funding 
from USAID and GTZ to undertake a 
Country Study which focuses on four areas: 
establishing an inventory of GHG emissions, 
undertaking an assessment of vulnerability 
and adaptation, researching mitigation 
options, and developing policy. The Country 
Study Programme is expected to be 
completed by the end of 1999 and will shed 
new light on the vulnerability of South Africa 
to climate change, adaptation needs and 
mitigation options. 
Sectors particularly vulnerable to climate 
change should seek further opportunities for 
funding to assess the measures required to 
adapt to the adverse effects of climate 
change. 
The emissions reduction commitments of 
industrialised countries make co-operation 
and investment with developing countries 
attractive. The COM is a mechanism to 
finance climate-friendly projects with 
sustainable development benefits for host 
developing countries in exchange for carbon 
credits for the investing industrialised party. 
South Africa has not yet ratified the Kyoto 
Protocol, but is likely to be an attractive 
country for investment through the COM if it 
does. COM projects are likely to target the 
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mining, forestry, transport and, particularly, 
the energy sectors. 
Conclusion 
There is considerable uncertainty around the 
climate change issue in its various 
dimensions, and it is important to establish its 
boundaries. A key area of uncertainty is the 
potential impacts of climate change on 
specific sub-regions, such as southern Africa. 
This uncertainty, coupled with the long 
periods over which it might occur, makes it 
extremely difficult to make assessments of the 
economic and social costs of possible climate 
change. Clearly, there is a need to conduct 
thorough research on the impacts of climate 
change on South Africa and its neighbours. 
Vulnerable areas, sectors and groups should 
be identified, and proposals made regarding 
future strategies to tackle the issue. GEF 
funding to enable research into adaptation 
measures should be sought. 
The impact of climate change response 
measures on South Africa's economic sectors 
also needs to be the subject of further 
research. For example, it is not yet clear how 
response measures affecting the coal and 
energy sectors will impact on South Africa's 
GDP and employment levels. Further 
research is also required to determine the 
potential investment benefits of mitigation 
options in the energy, mining and transport 
sectors. 
It is vitally important, that the South African 
government is proactive in its involvement in 
the international negotiations to ensure the 
best possible outcome for South Africa, 
bearing in mind the country's current status 
as a non-Annex I (developing) nation, and 
the possibility of future commitments . 
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The Fourth Conference of the Parties to the FCCC: Links 
between the agenda and the FCCC and Kyoto Protocol 
The agenda for the Fourth Conference of the 
Parties to the FCCC refers frequently to key 
articles of the FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
The table below provides an overview of the 
links between articles and agenda items. Note 
that almost all of the agenda items are also 
linked to decisions taken at the previous 
session of the Conference of the Parties (COP 
3). The are denoted as, for example, decision 
4/CP.3. The opening and closing 
administrative items on the agenda have not 
been included. 
Agenda item 
2. Organisational matters: 
3. Reports of subsidiary bodies: action on conclusions and guidance on future 
work: 
(a) Report of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice: 
(b) Report of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation; 
(c) Report of the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13. 
4. Review of the implementation of commitments: 
(a) Review of information communicated under Article 12 [Communication on 
implementation]: 
(i) National communications from Parties included in Annex I to the 
Convention; 
(ii) Initial national communications from Parties not included in Annex I; 
(b) Financial mechanism: 
(i) Report of the Global Environment Facility to the Conference; 
(ii) Review process referred to in decision 9/CP.1 
(c) Development and transfer of technologies (decision 13/CP.1); 
(d) Second review of the adequacy of Article 4.2(a) and (b) [Annex I 
commitments]; 
(e) Implementation of Article 4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention (decision 3/CP.3); 
(f) Activities implemented jointly: review of progress under the pilot phase 
(decision 5/CP 1); 
(g) Review of information and possible decisions under Article 4.2(f) 
[Amending Annexes]; 
(h) Other matters relating to implementation: 
(i) Research and systematic observation (Articles 4.1 (g) and 5 of the 
Convention); 
(ii) Scientific and methodological aspects of the proposal by Brazil. 
5. Matters related to the Kyoto Protocol: 
(a) Matters related to decision l!CP.3, paragraph 5 [rules and modalities for 
calculating: 
(i) Land-use change and forestry; 
(ii) Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol Uoint implementation]; 
(iii) Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol [clean development mechanism]; 
(iv) Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol [international emissions trading]; 
(v) Impact of single projects on emissions in the commitment period. 
(b) Matters related to decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 6: preparations for the first 
session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Protocol. 
6. Voluntary commitments by non-Annex I Parties. 
7. Administrative and financial matters (for the Convention] 
Ref. FCCC 
(or KP) 
7 
9 
10 
13 
12 
12.2-3 
12.1, 12.7 
11 
21 
4.1 (c) 
4.2 (a)-(b). 
4.2 (d) 
4.8,4.9 
4.2 (a) 
4.2 (f) 
4.1 (g), 5 
3.4 (KP) 
6 (KP) 
12 (KP) 
17 (KP) 
various (KP) 
4.2 (g) 
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Bloc positions and trends at COP4: 
The Southern perspective 
This document provides an overview of the 
non-Annex I (developing) country positions 
and trends in the international climate 
change negotiating process. While the focus 
of the document is on the Kyoto 
mechanisms. other issues which affect 
developing country unity are also discussed. 
Non-annex I groupings4 
G77 and China 
Rather than being a coherent or consistent 
voting bloc, the G77 and China is a loose 
coalition of developing countries who work 
together to develop common positions and 
present a united front on key issues in the 
climate change negotiations. 
Between 1995 and 1997 in the climate 
change negotiations, developing countries 
unified, under the G77 and China banner, in 
their resistance to the repeated attempts of 
the Umbrella Group to introduce voluntary 
commitments for developing countries. The 
unity of the developing countries on this 
issue spilled over into other areas, especially 
their positions on the flexible mechanisms. 
To date, the bargaining strength of the 
developing countries has rested in the unity 
of the G77 and China negotiating bloc. It 
consists of approximately 130 members 
who, however, also have widely differing 
interests. levels of development, and 
motivations. For example, China and others 
have enormous coal resources that are vital 
to their economic development. African 
countries tend to focus on their vulnerability 
and impacts. Many Asian countries are 
concerned about the possibility of being the 
next in line for emissions-reduction targets. 
The oil-producing countries are concerned 
with the adverse impacts of climate change 
mitigation measures on their economies. 
These varied interests began to emerge more 
strongly during the negotiations at COP4 
and signs of future rifts and splits are 
This section, specifically the text on G77 & 
China and OPEC. draws on Anderson, D, 
1998, The road to Buenos Aires: Political blocs 
and key issues in the climate change 
negotiations. ECON Centre for Economic 
Analysis, Oslo. 
beginning to show. Some of the issues in 
which the divergent interests of the 
developing county Parties are playing our 
are: 
• voluntary commitments, 
• compensation for the adverse effects oi 
climate change response measures, and 
• the timing for implementation of the 
CDM. 
Within the G77 and China there are several 
smaller groupings which represent more 
defined and similar interests. These include 
the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS;. 
the OPEC countries and the African Group. 
Alliance of Small Island States (AOSJS) 
AOSIS is an ad hoc coalition of low-lying 
and island countries that are particular!:,· 
vulnerable to the impacts of climate change. 
particularly sea-level rise, and that also share 
common public policy positions on climate 
change. 
AOSIS has played a prominent role in 
inciting support for the Convention and in 
the adoption of binding commitments. As a 
group, they support rapid action to reduce 
em1ss1ons and the strengthening of 
commitments for Annex I Parties. 
The two main issues for the AOSIS group 
are ensuring that the targets of the Kyoto 
Protocol result in rea/ emissions reductions 
and that the funding, activities, measures 
and guidelines for adaptation to climate 
change are put in place so that they can 
begin taking the practical steps alread:,· 
required to adapt to climate change and sea-
level rise. 
Note: The first three countries to ratify the 
Protocol were Fiji, Antigua-Barbuda and 
Tuvalu, all small island states. 
OPEC 
OPEC consists of 11 oil producing countries 
whose primary concern in the climate 
change debate is the likely impact on their 
economies if other countries reduce their use 
of oil. 
The OPEC countries are often considered by 
other countries to be attempting to halt or 
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hinder the climate change negotiation 
process. Supported by the US fossil fuel 
industry, the OPEC countries have been 
consistent leaders in questioning the actually 
existence of climate change as a human 
phenomenon. Up until COP 2 in 1996, the 
OPEC countries held a strong position in 
opposition to a legally binding protocol. 
Once, at COP 2, the US indicated that it 
would support legally binding commitments, 
the position of the OPEC countries changed 
- they began supporting the broader aims of 
the G77 and China group. At COP 3, the 
OPEC countries attempted to insert 
language into the proposed protocol 
providing a compensation mechanism for 
countries adversely affected by the 
implementation of climate change mitigation 
policies and measures. This was strongly 
opposed by most developed and many 
developing countries, especially AOSIS, 
whose focus was on strong action by the 
developed countries to avert potentially 
devastating physical effects of climate 
change. OPEC allowed the deletion of the 
language in the protocol, because the 
concept is protected by similar language 
enshrined in the Framework Convention. 
At Buenos Aires, the oil-producing and -
exporting countries argued that they should 
be included in the list of most vulnerable 
countries as their countries would be 
severely impacted as the world uses less oil. 
There were also continued attempts by the 
OPEC countries, led by Saudi Arabia, to 
insert the issue of compensation for loss of 
revenue resulting from climate change 
response measures. 
The African Group 
African group meetings were not well 
attended and African Parties focused their 
attention on the G77 and China meetings. 
Within the G77 and China group, however, 
the Parties from Africa showed a much 
stronger voice in Buenos Aires, than in 
previous sessions and were united on 
specific issues around the COM. 
Positions and trends 
The following section addresses the positions 
and trends in the G77 and China group on 
some of the significant issues for developing 
countries. 
£ti 
Flexible mechanisms 
In the development of the work programme 
for flexible mechanisms, a number of 
differences of opinion emerged both within 
the G77 and China bloc and between the 
developed and developing countries. 
Notably, the G77 and China wanted to the 
work to start where it ended during the 
previous session in Bonn and did not want 
the Secretariat to come up with a draft plan 
of action. The G77 and China were invited 
to draw up an action plan. This action plan 
was not accepted by the OECD countries 
who rejected it on the basis that it had no 
deadlines, timeline and allocation of work 
and on the basis of its prioritisation of the 
work, calling for the parallel development of 
all three mechanisms. Ultimately, Parties 
were invited to add to the G77 and China 
action plan, resulting in a comprehensive list 
of issues. While the issues of the G 77 and 
China are included in the work programme . 
issues that they do not agree with are also 
included. 
Supplementarity 
The G77 and China, for the most part, agree 
that supplementarity is an essential guiding 
concept for the mechanisms. The group take 
the view that there should be restrictions 
(caps) on flexible mechanisms to ensure that 
at least part of the commitments of 
developed countries are met through 
domestic action. The African group reiterates 
this position, arguing that the use of flexible 
mechanisms should be limited to an agreed 
amount, since the primary objective of the 
Protocol is to encourage domestic action. 
While some developing countries, such as 
China and India, believe that developed 
countries should meet most of their 
emissions reduction commitments through 
domestic action, others are more flexible 
with regard to the limitations on the use of 
mechanisms to achieve reduction targets. 
The EU supports the G77 and China's 
position on restrictions for flexible 
mechanisms, while the JUSSCANNZ 
countries view these mechanisms as a means 
to meeting their targets and are, therefore. 
opposed to caps. 
This issue will continue to raise significant 
debate in the negotiating process, 
particularly due the suspicion of some 
developing country Parties that the 
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mechanisms are designed by developed 
countries to avoid domestic abatement 
action and to force developing countries to 
accept commit-ments through the back door. 
Prioritisation of the COM 
A divergence of views emerged within the 
G77 and China group on the time frame for 
COM. The African group are keen to 
prioritise COM and get it started as soon as 
possible. They are supported by the Latin 
American countries who want the 
expeditious creation of the COM and 
propose an interim phase approach to 
develop guidelines and rules. 
Other G 77 and China countries want a 
slower approach to the COM. India and 
China insist that, before trading commences, 
the entitlements for both developed and 
developing nations must be defined. They 
argue that, without entitlements, COM is 
likely to benefit the richer G77 nations where 
Annex I countries can achieve fast, cheap 
emissions credits, with the poorer nations 
being over-looked as in the AIJ pilot phase. 
AOSIS also want procedures to be in place 
before going ahead with the COM. They 
argue that this will ensure that the 
mechanisms deliver real emission reductions. 
AOSIS want the COM to be given priority to 
resolve uncertainties, but want a work plan 
to resolve the issues. 
Despite the divergence of views, the G77 
and China held a united public position that 
a definition for trading must be established 
before the mechanisms are implemented. 
Review of AIJ 
The G77 and China supported the 
continuation of the AIJ pilot phase, but 
opposed text on crediting for AIJ pilot phase 
projects. However, some developing 
countries, for example Costa Rica, want 
qualifying projects under AIJ to become 
COM projects. Other developing countries, 
such as South Africa, argue that existing 
projects should not automatically be 
recognised as COM projects, but projects 
with merit could be considered. The AOSIS 
countries propose that pilot AIJ projects 
should continue, but should not be used for 
emission reduction credits under the Kyoto 
Protocol until the difficulties with verification 
of emissions reductions have been resolved. 
£( 
Voluntary commitments 
Voluntary commitments entered the climate 
change negotiations in 1997, when US 
senators signed the Byrd-Hagel Resolution 
which stated that the US Senate would not 
ratify any treaty to reduce emissions until 
there was meaningful participation from 
developing countries. 
The FCCC and the Kyoto Protocol do not 
require developing countries to commit to 
em1ss1ons limitation. Instead, they are 
allowed to increase emissions to achieve 
their development needs. While at COP 3. 
this issue unified that G 77 and China, at 
COP 4 voluntary commitments for 
developing countries became potentially the 
most divisive issue for the G 77 and China 
bloc. 
The issue resurfaced at COP 4 when 
Argentina suggested the inclusion of 
commitments from developing countries on 
the conference agenda. While the issue of 
developing country commitments was struck 
from the conference agenda after a strong 
negative reaction from developing country 
Parties, supported to some extent by the EU. 
it remained an item of discussion, with the 
US entering the issue into debate throughout 
the conference. 
While the majority of the developing 
countries are opposed to taking on voluntary 
commitments, at least until Annex I countries 
have shown demonstrable progress (a yet 
undefined term) toward achieving their 
commitments, Argentina and Kazakhstan 
broke ranks from the rest of the G77 by the 
end of the conference. Argentina agreed to 
take on voluntary commitments for the 2008 
to 2012 commitment period if the targets 
apply to expected growth in emissions rather 
than reducing current levels. Kazakhstan 
expressed its intent to take on commitments 
as an Annex I Party. Other countries such as 
Chile, Mexico and South Korea are said to 
be considering comparable steps. 
Adaptation and compensation 
In Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol, provision 
is made for an adaptation levy on COM 
projects to finance the cost of adaptation for 
those countries most vulnerable to the effects 
of climate change. 
Developing countries, most notably the 
AOSIS countries, call for the adaptation levy 
to be applied to all three mechanisms. They 
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view both funding for adaptation measures 
and activities and the COM as important, 
and do not want the COM to be prejudiced 
by the adaptation levy. 
In relation to adaptation, a divergence of 
opinions arose in the G 77 and China bloc 
around the push by the OPEC countries for 
compensation for loss of revenue due to a 
reduction in the use of fossil fuels. OPEC, 
represented by Saudi Arabia, expressed 
intent to link compensation to the adaptation 
costs for countries likely to be worst affected 
by climate change. The rest of the G77 and 
China were unwilling to accept these efforts. 
Adverse effects on developing 
countries 
Most developing country Parties view the 
operationalisation of Articles 4.8 and 4.9, 
which refer to the adverse effects of climate 
change and climate change response 
measures on developing countries, as a very 
important tool which can assist those 
countries particularly vulnerable to the 
adverse effects of climate change and climate 
change response measures to be able to 
develop in a sustainable manner. 
The OPEC countries view the Articles as an 
opportunity to negotiate an insurance regime 
or fund that would compensate for their 
economic losses resulting from the reduction 
in oil imports. 
Developing country Parties argued that 
Annex I Parties should identify, and include 
in their national communications 
information on, possible impacts of response 
measures, arguing that information should 
be provided by those who have the capacity 
and resources. The developed countries, 
notably the US, Japan and Canada, saw it 
as impractical or impossible to assess 
impacts outside their borders and argued 
that developing countries were best placed 
to identify the effects. 
Technology transfer 
Three proposals were submitted (by the US, 
the G77 and China and the EU) on the issue 
of the development and transfer of 
technology to developing counties. 
The G77 and China proposal called for 
efforts to enhance indigenous capacities and 
provide an enabling environment; as well as 
focusing on identifying the means to link the 
issues and provide an interface between the 
providers of the technology and the 
recipients. The G77 and China proposed a 
technology transfer mechanism (TTM) to 
assist developing country Parties to obtain 
their needed environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how conducive to 
addressing climate change on non-
commercial and preferential terms and thus 
contribute to the ultimate objective of the 
Convention. G77 and China argued that the 
TTM would facilitate progress and assist all 
Parties in fulfilling the Convention objectives. 
While there was consensus on the capacity 
building component of the G77 and China 
proposal, the US and other developed 
countries strongly objected to the use of the 
terms non-commercial and preferential. 
While the G77 and China favoured retaining 
reference to a TTM in the decision, they 
accepted 'to achieve agreement on a 
framework of meaningful and effective 
action' in its place. Bracketed text reference 
in the Annex asked whether existing 
multilateral mechanisms were sufficient. 
There was also agreement among G77 and 
China that technology transfer processes 
should first be enhanced under the 
Framework Convention and then the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
Conclusions 
The meeting ended with a few victories for 
the G77 and China countries on issues 
related to financial and technology transfer. 
The final work programme on the flexibility 
mechanisms included the list of items they 
had submitted, with equity and transparency 
and a basis of rights and entitlements of 
Annex B parties for emissions trading among 
them . 
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- G77 +China 
Afghanistan Dominica Libyan Arab Samoa 
Algeria DPRKorea Jamahiriya Saudi Arabia 
- Angola Dominican Malawi Sao Tome & 
Argentina Rep Ecuador Malaysia Principe 
Bahamas DR Congo Maldives Senegal 
-
Antigua & Barbuda Egypt Mali Seychelles 
Bahrain El Salvador Malta Sierra Leone 
Bangladesh Equatorial Guinea Marshall Islands Singapore 
-
Barbados Eritrea Mauritania Somalia 
Belize Ethiopia Mauritius Solomon Islands 
Benin Fiji Micronesia South Africa 
-
Bhutan Gabon Mongolia Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Gambia Morocco Sudan 
Botswana Ghana Mozambique Suriname 
-
Bosnia & Grenada Myanmar Swaziland 
Herzegovina Guatemala Namibia Syrian Arab 
Brazil Guinea Nepal Republic 
-
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Nicaragua Thailand 
Brunei Darussalam Guyana Niger Togo 
Burundi Haiti Nigeria Tonga 
Cambodia Honduras Oman Tunisia 
- Cameroon India Pakistan Turkmenistan 
Cape Verde Indonesia Palestine Trinidad & Tobago 
Chad Iran Panama Uganda 
-
Chile Iraq Papua New Guinea Uruguay 
China Jamaica Paraguay United Arab 
Colombia Jordan Peru Emirates 
-
Central African Rep. Kenya Philippines U. Rep. Tanzania 
Comoros Kuwait Qatar Vanuatu 
Congo Lebanon Romania Venezuela 
-
Costa Rica Lesotho Rwanda Vietna 
Cote d'lvoire Lao PDR St Kitts & Nevis Yemen 
Cuba Liberia St Lucia Yugoslavia 
-
Cyprus Madagascar St Vincent & Zambia 
Djibouti Grenadines Zimbabwe 
A OS IS 
-
American Samoa F. Ss of Micronesia Mauritius Soa Tome & 
Antigua & Barbuda Fiji Nauru Principe 
Bahamas Grenada Netherlands Antilles Seychelles 
-
Barbados Guam Niue Singapore 
Belize Guinea-Bissau Palau Solomon Islands 
Cape Verde Guyana Papua New Guinea Suriname 
-
Comoros Jamaica Saint Kitts & Nevis Tonga 
Cook Islands Kiribati Saint Lucia Trinidad & Tobago 
Cuba Maldives Samoa Tuvalu 
-
Cyprus Malta S. Vincent & US Virgin Islands 
Dominica Marshall Islands Grenadines Vanuatu 
OPEC 
-
Algeria Nigeria 
Indonesia Qatar 
Iraq Saudi Arabia 
-
Islamic Republic of Iran United Arab Emirates 
Kuwait Venezuela 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
-
-
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Bloc positions and trends at COP 4: The Annex I 
perspective 
This document looks as some of the issues of 
importance to the Annex I countries in the 
climate change negotiations and addresses 
some of the differences in positions among 
those countries. 
Annex I blocs 
With the exception of the European Union 
(EU), there are no formal blocs within the 
Annex I countries. Countries with similar 
positions on certain issues consult with each 
other, but rarely coordinate positions. The 
EU is the one exception as it is a recognized 
legal entity. The EU position is coordinated 
among the 15 EU countries, with the country 
holding the EU presidency speaking on 
behalf of the EU. 
• JUSSCANNZ is an Annex group 
comprised of a range of countries not in 
the EU. They meet to share information 
on issues pertaining to the negotiations. 
Members are free to voice their own 
sovereign views on any issue, and they do 
not participate in the negotiations as a 
bloc. Members of JUSSCANNZ include 
Japan, the US, Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, iceland, Korea, Norway, Mexico, 
Russia, and Switzerland. 
• Countries with economies in transition 
(EITs) include the Central and Eastern 
European countries and countries who 
were once part of the Soviet Union. As 
with JUSSCANNZ. this group does not 
speak as a bloc in the negotiations. 
• The EU and JUSSCANNZ countries 
periodically meet in a Common Interest 
Group in order to share information on 
the negotiations. 
COP 3 saw the formation of an informal 
group of 'like-minded' countries (primarily on 
em1ss1ons trading) called the Umbrella 
Group. Countries in this group include: 
Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, Russian Federation, 
Ukraine and the United States of America. 
The coordination within the Umbrella Group 
has over time expanded to the other Kyoto 
mechanisms and some related questions. 
Because of its informal nature, countries 
within the Umbrella Group do not necessarily 
have one common position, and act on their 
own behalf. 
Another post-Kyoto development is a greater 
coordination between the EU and 
Switzerland and the eastern European 
countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Croatia. 
Latvia, Slovenia, Poland and Bulgaria). As 
with the Umbrella Group, the coordination 
has been primarily on the Kyoto 
mechanisms. 
Positions and trends 
The Buenos Aires Action Plan 
In the Buenos Aires Action Plan, the Parties 
resolved to reach decisions by the end of 
2000 on a number of key issues, including: 
• principles, modalities, rules and guidelines 
for the Kyoto mechanisms; 
• compliance rules and 
including consequences 
compliance; 
procedures, 
for non-
• development and transfer of technologies; 
and 
• implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 
and 9 of the Convention. 
The mechanisms 
One of the primary focuses of the ongoing 
negotiations for Annex I countries is the 
Kyoto mechanisms. Annex I countries 
generally agree on the need to make progress 
on the Kyoto mechanisms, and hold many 
similar views on organisational and 
institutional issues. Although Annex I 
countries would have preferred to see more 
concrete progress, they view the 'Buenos 
Aires Plan of Action' (with its clear date for 
decisions to be taken) as a step forward. 
There are two predominant views among 
Annex I countries on the mechanisms, the 
EU and the Umbrella Group. The major 
difference between the two groups is on the 
issue of 'supplemental', i.e., whether the 
mechanisms should be supplemental to 
domestic actions. The EU tends to try to deal 
with the issue in each mechanism while the 
Umbrella Group views it as an issue linked to 
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all three mechanisms. This is an issue 
pertaining to all three mechanisms. 
• The EU and associated countries have 
pushed for a concrete ceiling applied .to all 
the mechanisms that would reqUire a 
certain amount of emissions reductions to 
occur domestically. This would put a limit 
on em1ss1ons trading, joint 
implementation, and the COM. The EU 
has been unable to go any further on this 
issue since there are various positions 
within the EU countries on how and 
whether to quantitatively define 
supplemental. 
• The countries within the Umbrella Group 
are opposed to defining supplemental 
since they feel it will be difficult to assess 
and that under the COM fewer projects 
would be initiated. Some of the countries 
within the Umbrella Group may be willing 
to consider a qualitative definition where 
an assessment could be made based on 
the review of reports such as through the 
National Communication process. 
The AIJ Pilot Phase 
Although many Annex I countries in Buenos 
Aires felt that a conclusive decision on the 
pilot phase could be taken, there was a 
general acknowledgement that non-Annex I 
countries were clearly not ready for this. 
Compromise language, as reflected in the 
COP Decision 6/CP.4, begins a process for 
reviewing the pilot phase. The process for 
reviewing the pilot phase will be a topic for 
discussion at the upcoming session (tenth 
session of the Subsidiary Bodies) in June. It is 
likely that Annex I countries will again press 
for a conclusive decision to be taken no later 
than COP 6. One of the reasons for this is 
that one lesson that can already be learned 
from the pilot phase is that the lack of 
crediting has lessened interest by the private 
sector in projects that could be eligible under 
the AIJ pilot phase. 
Compliance 
Annex I countries are generally in agreement 
on the need for a stringent compliance 
system under the Kyoto Protocol. A joint 
SBSTA and SBI working group on 
compliance under the Kyoto Protocol was 
established in Decision 8/CP.4. 
;$1 
Development and transfer of technology 
This has been a particularly difficult issue 
throughout the entire negotiating process. 
One of the main reasons for this is the 
difference of opinion in how technology 
transfer actually works, and whether 
governments or the private sector should be 
responsible for its implementation. At COP 4, 
one developing country stated that 
governments undertook the moral obligation 
to transfer technology to non-Annex I 
governments on a preferential, non-
commercial basis. Annex I countries counter, 
however, that technology is not owned by 
governments - the private sector is and 
should be the main vehicle for technology 
transfer. 
Annex I countries, in general, have realized 
that progress needs to be made in this area, 
but have been somewhat unsure of the best 
way to proceed. Buenos Aires saw one of the 
first breakthroughs in establishing a 
consultative process that could be useful and 
practical for all Parties. 
Implementation of Article 4, paras 8 and 
9 
Annex I countries are unified in their 
approach on the issue of implementing 
Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9. Annex I 
countries do acknowledge that less 
developed countries have legitimate concerns 
related to the adverse impacts of climate 
change which need to be addressed. 
However, the issue of implementing Article 
4.8 and 4.9, was introduced during the 
AGBM process by OPEC as a way to 
compensate countries for any revenue lost 
due to mitigation measures undertaken to 
meet Annex I commitments (hence the term 
compensation). It has been seen as a 'poison 
pill' by many Annex I Parties, one that is 
intended to either slow down or stop the 
negotiation process. For the moment, the 
issue will be addressed through a workshop 
process that should elaborate more on the 
different perspectives and questions related to 
the issue. 
Land use change and forestry 
Land Use Change and Forestry issues have 
been somewhat contentious. In the lead up 
to Kyoto, the EU held a conservative view on 
what should and should not be included in 
the Protocol. Since then, many Parties within 
Annex I have preferred to wait for the 
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outcome of an IPCC special report on these 
issues. The issue is still under discussion in 
the CDM. The EU, because it is not explicitly 
mention in Article 12, feel that sinks should 
not be included. The predominant view 
among Umbrella Group countries is that an 
explicit mention is not needed particularly 
since Article 3 states that certain types of 
activities can be included. 
In the Buenos Aires Action Plan, Parties 
agreed to move forward with a process to 
define, measure and verify various categories 
of carbon sinks and have tasked the IPCC 
with conducting a comprehensive study on 
land-use change and forestry activities, due in 
2000. 
Adequacy of commitments 
The adequacy of commitments under the 
Convention has been a long-standing issue of 
contention. Annex I countries, to varying 
degrees, argue that in order to fulfill the 
ultimate objective of the Convention, more 
will need to be done by all Parties. The 
United States has been one of the leaders in 
the call for greater developing country 
participation. The US Senate has said that it 
will not ratify the Protocol without 
'meaningful participation by key developing 
countries'. It is unclear what will be needed 
to meet the Senate's vague criteria. 
COP 4 produced a deadlock on the review of 
the adequacy of commitments pertaining to 
Annex I Parties (Article 4.2, paragraphs a and 
b). Annex I countries generally feel that 
Parties have already concluded that the 
commitments are inadequate and have 
addressed that inadequacy by undertaking 
binding commitments under the Kyoto 
Protocol. They would also argue that the 
commitments will continue to be inadequate 
until developing countries take on additional 
commitments. Most Annex I countries have 
stated that they do not foresee non-Annex I 
countries taking on the same level of 
commitment as Annex I countries. The US, 
for instance, has stated that what they 
envisage is a growth target (so that emissions 
would grow, but at a lower rate than it would 
have without the commitment) for some key 
developing countries. 
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Decisions adopted at COP 4 
After two weeks of debate by 170 
governments in Buenos Aires, the main 
outcome of the COP 4 was the adoption of a 
two year Plan of Action which aims to have 
the Kyoto Protocol fully operational by the 
time it enters into force after the year 2000. 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
The Buenos Aires Plan of Action sets 
deadlines for the finalisation of the 
outstanding details of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Apart from detailing a two-year work 
programme to establish the principles, 
modalities, rules and guidelines for the Kyoto 
mechanisms (7/CP.4), the Plan of Action also 
addresses the adverse effects of climate 
change and implementation strategies 
(5/CP.4), the transfer of environmentally 
friendly technologies to developing countries 
(4/CP.4), review of the and additional 
guidance to the operating entity of the 
financial mechanism (2/CP.4 and 3/CP.4), 
AIJ under the pilot phase (6/CP.4) and 
preparation for the first COP setving as a 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(8/CP.4). 
Financial mechanism 
Two decisions were taken on the financial 
mechanism, namely additional guidance to 
be provided to GEF (2/CP.4) and the status 
of the GEF as an operating entity of the 
financial mechanism (3/CP.4 ). 
The decisions on the additional guidance to 
the GEF include (2/CP.4): 
• Provision of funding to developing 
countries for adaptation activities; 
including the implementation of 
adaptation response measures, and the 
identification of their prioritised 
technology needs, especially key 
technologies needed to minimise the 
adverse effects of climate change. 
• Provision of funding to developing 
countries to build capacity for 
participation in systematic obsetvational 
networks to reduce scientific uncertainties 
related to climate change; for the 
assessment and fulfilment of technology 
needs to meet their commitments under 
the Convention; to design, evaluate and 
manage country-driven activities and 
projects; to host projects; and to facilitate 
national and regional access to the 
information provided by international 
centres and networks. 
• Provision of funding to developing 
countries to meet the agreed full cost for 
the preparation of the initial and 
subsequent national communications. 
• Improvement of the operations of GEF . 
including streamlining its project cycle; 
expediting its procedures for the approval 
and implementation of GEF-funded 
projects, including disbursements for 
such projects; and making the process of 
determining incremental costs more 
transparent and pragmatic. 
There was substantial debate at COP 4 on 
the issue of funding of subsequent national 
communications - certain developed country 
Parties wanted the availability of GEF 
funding for subsequent national 
communications to be contingent on the 
successful review of the initial 
communications. Some developing countries 
indicated that their initial communications 
were poor due to lack of capacity. The issue 
was resolved by a provision that the GEF 
would fund second national communications 
that will take into account experiences. 
including gaps and problems identified in 
previous national communications, and 
guidelines established by the COP. 
While no decision was reached on the final 
status of the GEF, decision 3/CP.4 establishes 
the restruc-tured GEF as an operational entity 
of the financial mechanism and establishes a 
process of review of the financial mechanism 
every four years. 
Technology transfer 
Decision 4/CP.4 refers to the strengthening of 
technology transfer to developing countries. 
The final decision requests the Chairman of 
SBSTA to establish a consultative process to 
consider a preliminary list of issues and 
questions contained in the annex to the 
decision to make recommendations on how 
they should be addressed in order to achieve 
agreement on a framework for meaningful 
and effective actions to enhance 
implementation of Article 4.5 of the 
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Convention. The process should consider 
issues identified in the secretariat's progress 
report on transfer of technology and in 
submissions from Parties. The consultation 
process could include, resources permitting, 
regional meetings and workshops and a 
SBSTA workshop. The Chairman of SBSTA 
should report on the outcome of the 
consultative process to SBSTA at its eleventh 
session, with a view to recommending a 
decision for the COP at its fifth session. 
The decision also includes requests to Annex 
I. and especially Annex II, countries to take a 
range of steps to transfer appropriate climate 
change technology to developing countries. 
These include: 
• Creating an enabling environment for the 
transfer of environmentally sound 
technologies by supporting capacity 
building and strengthening appropriate 
institutions in developing countries. 
• Assisting developing countries to build 
capacity and institutional frameworks to 
improve energy efficiency and use of 
renewable energies through multilateral 
and bilateral co-operative efforts. 
• Assisting developing countries to build 
capacity for sustainable management, 
conservation and enhancement of sinks 
and reservoirs of greenhouse gases; to 
adapt to the adverse effects of climate 
change; and to undertake technological 
and socio-economic research and 
systematic observation relevant to 
climate change and its adverse effects. 
• Providing a list of environmentally sound 
technologies and know-how related to 
adaptation to and mitigation of climate 
change that are publicly owned for 
reference by developing countries. 
Articles 4.8 and 4.9 of the Convention 
Articles 4.8 and 4. 9 of the Convention are 
concerned with how to address the adverse 
effects of climate change and the impact of 
the implementation of response measures, 
specifically in relation to developing 
countries. Decision 5/CP.4 addresses the 
process required to identify the actions 
needed to operationalise and implement 
these Articles. 
The basic elements for further analysis 
decided upon include identifying: 
J4 
• adverse effects of climate change and of 
the impacts of the implementation of 
response measures under the 
Convention; 
• specific needs and concerns of 
developing country Parties arising from 
such adverse effects and impacts; 
• actions, including actions related to 
funding, insurance and the transfer of 
technology, to meet the specific needs 
and concerns of developing countries. 
Initial actions to address the implementation 
of the Articles are to be identified by COP 5 
and a decision is to be taken on further 
actions by COP 6, October 2000. 
AIJ under the pilot phase 
The Buenos Aires action plan decides to 
continue the AIJ pilot phase to allow 
developing country Parties to enhance their 
capacity building and for all Parties to gain 
further experience with AIJ (6/CP.4). 
While a date was not set for the review of the 
pilot phase, a decision was taken to make 
preparations for the review process. The SBI 
and the SBSTA are requested to address the 
process at their tenth sessions and to take a 
conclusive decision on the pilot phase, and 
the progression beyond that, by the end of 
the year 2000. 
Work programme on mechanisms 
A two-year work programme on the Kyoto 
mechanisms - Joint Implementation (Article 
6), the Clean Development Mechanism 
(Article 12) and Emissions Trading (Article 
17) - is established to develop guidelines. 
modalities, rules and procedures to 
operationalise the mechanisms (7/Cp.4). The 
work programme is to be undertaken with 
priority given to the Clean Development 
Mechanism and with a view to taking 
decisions on all three mechanisms at COP 6 
and, where appropriate, recommendations to 
the COP/moP I on the following: 
• Guidelines for Joint Implementation. 
• Modalities and procedures for a clean 
development mechanism, with the 
objective of ensuring transparency, 
efficiency and accountability through 
independent auditing and verification of 
project activities, and including the 
implications of early crediting for COM 
.. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Climate cnange onetmgs 
projects (Article 12.10 of the Kyoto 
Protocol). 
• Principles, modalities, rules and 
guidelines, in particular verification, 
reporting and accountability of emissions 
trading, pursuant to Article 17 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. 
A list of elements for further discussion are 
attached as an annex to the decision. Parties 
are invited to make submissions on the 
principles, modalities, rules and guidelines for 
the mechanisms by the end of February 1999 
and additional proposals by the end of March 
1999. 
The process by which the list of elements, 
which forms the work programme on 
mechanisms, was developed resulted in a 
compromise document which is all inclusive. 
The G77 and China were invited to submit 
an action plan, to which other Parties were 
then invited to add issues - the result was a 
long and unwieldy list of elements, which fails 
to eliminate any issues from discussion. 
Further debate is likely to be required to 
condense the list before work on the 
substantive issues of the mechanisms can 
begin. 
Preparations for COP/moP I 
The preparatory work for the first session of 
the Conference of the Parties serving as the 
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol 
(COP/moP I) is allocated to the SBI and the 
SBSTA {8/CP.4). The preparatory work 
includes establishing national systems and 
methodologies for estimating emissions and 
global warming potentials for different gases; 
guidelines for the preparation and review of 
supplemental information required to fulfil 
commitments under the Protocol, including 
information to demonstrate compliance with 
commitments; and guidelines, modalities and 
procedures related to the COM, compliance, 
assigned amounts, and joint implementation. 
The subsidiary bodies are invited to report on 
these preparations at COP 5. 
Land-use, land-use change and 
forestry 
The discussion on land-use, land-use change 
and forestry at COP 4 focused on Articles 3.3 
and 3.4 of the Kyoto Protocol, which refer to 
the accounting for emissions from land-use 
change and forestry and the setting up of the 
modalities, guidelines and rules for the 
accounting. 
A decision {9/CP.4) was taken on how to 
interpret Article 3.3 of the Protocol and the 
COP set itself a target of COP/moP I for the 
development of further draft decisions on the 
definitions related to activities under Article 
3.3 of the Protocol; the modalities, rules and 
guidelines related to Article 3.4 of the 
Protocol and the guidelines for necessary 
supplemental information. 
Multilateral consultative process 
Article 13 of the Convention makes provision 
for a Multilateral Consultative Process to 
resolve questions about the implementation 
of the Convention. The Ad Hoc Group on 
Article 13 was set up to define the principles 
of the Multilateral Consultative Process. The 
COP approved the text of the multilateral 
consultative process, set out in Annex II to 
the report of the Ad Hoc Group on Article 13 
on its sixth session, with the exception of the 
issues in square brackets in paragraph 8 and 
9 of the annex (10/CP.4). Paragraphs 8 and 
9 refer to the Multilateral Consultative 
Committee and the criteria for designating 
members to the Committee. The proposal 
suggests that members of the Committee 
should be designated by the COP for three 
years and that designation should be based 
on equitable distribution and rotations. Some 
developed countries opposed this basis for 
designation, proposing a 50:50 composition 
of developed and developing countries. No 
consensus could be reached on this issue 
and, therefore, it was bracketed and not 
adopted. 
The COP decided to review these issues at 
COP 5, with a view to adopting a multilateral 
consultative process and to establish the 
Multilateral Consultative Committee referred 
to in the process once these issues have been 
resolved. 
National communications from 
Parties included in Annex I to 
the Convention 
Decision ll/CP.4 on the National 
communications from Parties included in 
Annex I to the Convention primarily 
addresses the inadequacy of reporting by the 
Annex I Parties to-date and sets deadlines 
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and requests guidelines to improve reporting 
procedures. 
The 13 February 1999, or as soon as possible 
thereafter, was set as the target deadline for 
Annex I Parties who have not submitted their 
first national communication. 
Furthermore, Annex I Parties are requested 
to submit the following to the secretariat: 
• A third national communication by 30 
November 2001 and subsequent national 
communications on a regular basis, at 
intervals to be decided on at a future 
session. Parties who are yet to submit 
their second national communication 
should submit them by the 30 November 
2001. 
• National inventory data on emissions of 
greenhouse gases by sources and 
removal by sinks on an annual basis by 
15 April for the period up to the last but 
one year prior to the year of submission. 
• Summary tables of national inventory 
data. 
National communications should be subject 
to an in-depth review and the subsidiary 
bodies are requested to consider the scope, 
modalities and options for the review 
process. 
Initial national communications 
from Parties not included in 
Annex I to the Convention 
Each non-Annex I Party is required to make 
their initial national communications within 
three years of entry into force of the 
Convention for that Party and will receive 
technical and financial support to achieve 
these objectives. Least developed Parties may 
make their initial communications at their 
discretion. 
No substantive decisions on non-Annex I 
national communications were agreed upon 
at COP 4 and the issue will be further 
addressed at COP 5. 
Relationships between efforts to 
protect the stratospheric ozone 
layer and efforts to safeguard 
the global climate system 
The discussion on the relationship between 
the efforts under the Montreal Protocol and 
the efforts under the Framework Convention 
focus on hydrofluorocarbons and 
perfluorocarbons. Hydro-flourocarbons and 
perfluorocarbons are among the substances 
that are being used to replace ozone-
depleting substances. These substances have 
high global warming potentials, however. 
and are listed in Annex A of the Kyoto 
Protocol as greenhouse gases. Decision 
13/CP.4 focuses on the need to consider 
available and potential ways and means of 
limiting emissions of hydrofluorocarbons and 
perfluorocarbons in the context of the Kyoto 
Protocol. Parties, the relevant bodies of the 
Montreal Protocol, the IPCC. 
intergovernmental organisations and non-
governmental organisations are invited to 
provide information to the secretariat by 15 
July 1999 on potential ways and means of 
limiting emissions of these substances. 
Research and systematic 
observation 
To improve existing observation systems 
which are limited in their application to 
climate change, the COP urges Parties to 
(14/CP.4): 
• undertake programmes of systematic 
observation; 
• undertake free and unrestricted exchange 
of data to meet the needs of the 
Convention; 
• support capacity building in developing 
countries to collect, exchange and use 
data to meet local, regional and 
international needs; and 
• support national terrestrial, oceanic and 
meteorological and atmospheric 
observing systems. 
Review of information and 
possible decisions under Article 
4.2(f) of the Convention 
Article 4.2(f) of the Convention calls on the 
COP to review the lists in Annex I and II 
Parties to the Convention by December 
1998. At both COP 3 and COP 4, the 
discussion in relation to this Article was 
focused on Turkey's request that it be 
removed from the list of Annex I and II. 
Turkey has argued that economically it is not 
in a position to take on commitments as an 
Annex I and Annex II Party and that its 
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ratification of the Convention is being 
delayed by the fact that it has been classified 
as such. 
No decision was taken on the issue of 
deleting Turkey's name from the lists 
included in Annexes I and II at COP4. The 
matter will be reviewed further at COPS and 
a request was made to place the matter on 
the COP 5 agenda (decision 15/CP.4). 
Turkey's request to be deleted from the lists 
included in Annexes I and II may be further 
complicated by the fact that, at COP 4, 
Kazakhstan indicated its intent to take on 
commitments as an Annex I Party. The 
question arises: why, if Kazakhstan is 
included as an Annex I Party, should Turkey 
not be? 
Impact of single projects on 
emissions in the commitment 
period 
The discussion related to this issue has 
centred around Iceland's request for an 
exemption from its Kyoto Protocol 
commitments so it can build an aluminium 
smelter which would be powered by 
geothermal energy which does not produce 
greenhouse gases. 
The decision on Iceland's request was 
postponed, with a request being made to 
SBSTA to provide additional information on 
the matter and a resolution being made to 
take a decision on the matter, as appropriate, 
at COP 5 (16/CP.4). 
One of the principal concerns in relation to 
this matter expressed by developing 
countries, notably the AOSIS bloc, has been 
whether granting an exemption before the 
Kyoto Protocol even comes into force will set 
a precedent which would allow other 
polluting industries or countries to gain an 
exemption. 
Administrative and financial 
matters 
Decision 17/CP.4 addresses the 
administrative and financial matters 
pertaining to the operation of the 
Convention. The financial statements and 
audited reports of the 1996-1997 period and 
the financial performance for the 1998-1999 
period are acknowledged. The indicative 
'j{ 
scale of contributions to the core budget 
which follows the principle that all Parties 
should contribute to the Convention budget 
is adopted. The new indicative scale for the 
biennium 1998-1999 which is adjusted to 
ensure that no Party contributes less than 
0.001% of the total; that no one contribution 
exceeds 25% of the total ; and that no 
contribution from a least developed country 
Party exceeds 0.01% is adopted. 
Attendance of intergovernmental 
and non-governmental 
organisations at contact groups 
At previous COPs, intergovernmental and 
non-governmental organisations were able to 
attend plenary meetings of the SBSTA and 
SBI, but were not able to attend the contact 
group meetings. One of the first items on the 
agenda at COP 4 was the attendance of 
intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organisations at the contact group meetings. 
A decision (18/CP.4) was taken that ... the 
presiding officers of Convention bodies may 
invite representatives of intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organizations to 
attend as observers any open-ended contact 
group established under the Convention 
process. However, if at least one-third of the 
Parties present at the session of the 
Convention body setting up that contact 
group object, the contact group will be closed 
to observers. Furthermore, the presiding 
officers of contact groups may determine to 
close the contact group to intergovernmental 
and non-governmental organisations at any 
time during their proceedings. 
At COP 4, intergovernmental and non-
governmental organisations were able to 
attend the contact groups as observers during 
the first week of the proceedings. During the 
second week, as the negotiations became 
more sensitive, the contact groups were 
closed to observers to facilitate open 
discussion within the groups. 
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Calendar of meetings of the 
Convention bodies 
• Second sessional period in 2000: 16 to 
27 October (provisional dates) 
• First sessional period in 2001: 21 May to 
1 June The calendar of meetings for the Convention 
bodies for the years 2000 - 2001 were 
decided as follows (decision 19/CP/4): • Second sessional period in 2001: 29 October to 9 November 
• First sessional period in 2000: 5 to 16 
June 
The annual COP will take place in the second 
sessional period of each of the years. 
Decisions adopted by the COP 
1/CP.4 Buenos Aires Plan of Action 
2/CP.4 
3/CP.4 
4/CP.4 
S/CP.4 
6/CP.4 
7/CP.4 
8/CP.4 
9/CP.4 
10/CP.4 
11/CP.4 
12/CP.4 
13/CP.4 
14/CP.4 
15/CP.4 
16/CP.4 
17/CP.4 
18/CP.4 
19/CP.4 
Additional guidance to the operating entity of the financial mechanism 
Review of the financial mechanism 
Development and transfer of technologies 
Implementation of Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention (decision 
3/CP.3 and Articles 2.3 and 3.14 of the Kyoto Protocol) 
Activities implemented jointly under the pilot phase 
Work programme on mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol 
Preparations for the first session of the COP serving as the meeting of the Parties 
to the Kyoto Protocol: matters related to decision 1/CP.3, paragraph 6 
Land-use, land-use change and forestry 
Multilateral consultative process 
National communications from Parties included in Annex I to the Convention 
Initial national communications from Parties not included in Annex I to the 
Convention 
Relationship between efforts to protect the stratospheric ozone layer and efforts 
to safeguard the global climate system: issues related to hydrofluorocarbons and 
perfluorocarbons 
Research and systematic observation 
Review of information and possible decisions under Article 4.2 (f) of the 
Convention 
Impact of single projects on emissions in the commitment period 
Administrative and financial matters 
Attendance of intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations at 
contact groups 
Calendar of meeting of Convention bodies 2000 - 2001 
-.. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Gllmate cnange tmetlngs 
Tenth Session of the Subsidiary Bodies 
The tenth sessions of the Subsidiary Body for 
Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary 
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice 
(SBSTA) will meet in Bonn from May 31 to 
June 11. The provisional agenda has not yet 
been made available. Items likely to be on 
the agenda would include core issues in the 
Buenos Aires Plan of Action: the pilot phase 
AIJ, the Kyoto Mechanisms, development 
and transfer of technology, and Articles 4.8 
and 4.9. Other items that are likely to be on 
the agenda include land-use change and 
forestry, the financial mechanism, national 
communications, and preparatory work for 
the first COP/moP - an overlapping and 
broad topic. 
Decisions taken by the COP at its fourth 
session called for submissions by Parties on 
many issues. Most of these submissions are 
not yet available. It is, therefore, difficult to 
say with any certainty what may happen in 
Bonn. Once submissions are available, it will 
become a bit easier to identify potential areas 
of agreement and disagreement. 
Review process of the AIJ pilot phase 
The Conference of the Parties is to take a 
conclusive decision on the pilot phase, and 
the progression beyond that, no later than 
the end of the present decade. In order to 
take a decision, it is likely that a review of the 
pilot phase will be undertaken. In Decision 
6/CP.4, Parties were asked to submit views 
on the "process and information on 
experience gained and lessons learned" with 
the AIJ pilot phase in order to facilitate the 
review process. Submissions will be released 
as MISC documents and are likely to be used 
as a basis for discussions in June. 
In previous sessions, there was a clear split 
between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties on 
continuing the pilot phase. Non-Annex I 
countries, in general, have argued for the 
continuation of the pilot phase in order to 
gain more experience. Annex I countries feel 
that enough experience has been gained and 
that there may not be many more AIJ 
projects forthcoming. There is a general 
acknowledgment that a decision on the pilot 
phase is not likely to occur until COP 6. 
Expected outcome: Parties will begin 
designing the process by which the AIJ pilot 
phase will be reviewed. A final decision, 
however, on the review process is not likely 
to occur until COP 5. 
The Kyoto mechanisms 
To date, discussion during various sessions of 
the subsidiary bodies on the mechanisms has 
focused on agreeing on a list of elements that 
should be discussed. Progress was slow and 
complicated by the inclusion of political 
issues not directly related to the mechanisms. 
There is a general acknowledgement by 
many Parties that discussions on the 
mechanisms based on this list (contained in 
Decision 7/CP.4) would be difficult and 
complicated at best. 
Decision 7/CP.4 specified that two technical 
workshops are to take place with inputs from 
Parties and drawing on relevant contributions 
from intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations. The UNFCCC 
Secretariat, in response to this decision, 
arranged a comprehensive workshop 
(thereby collapsing the two workshops in 
one) in early April in Bonn, Germany, 
focusing on technical aspects of all three 
mechanisms. The workshop provided a 
forum for non-Annex I and Annex I Parties to 
discuss the mechanisms in a less politicized 
arena. 
Although some Parties may wish to continue 
using the list of elements, many Parties seem 
to be willing to find a more productive 
method for working on the mechanisms. 
Submissions for the technical workshop 
included potential legal text for the 
mechanisms and may be a way that progress 
on the mechanisms can be made. 
Expected outcome: The negotiations are 
likely to move away from the list of elements 
and begin to focus on the submissions by 
Parties. There is also interest by Parties to 
find a way to move forward on technical 
issues. This will be particularly important for 
the COM. If sufficient agreement can be 
reached, a decision could be reached on how 
to move forward on technical issues. 
Development & transfer of technology 
In Decision 4/CP.4, Parties and interested 
international and non-governmental 
organisations were asked to identify projects 
and programs on cooperative approaches to 
technology transfer that could be models for 
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improved diffusion and implementation of 
clean technologies. Parties were also 
requested to respond to questions and issues 
in an annex to the Decision. A consultative 
process was established to consider the issues 
in the annex, submissions by Parties and the 
secretariat's progress report on technology 
transfer. Under the consultative process, 
regional workshops and meetings are to be 
held if resources permit it. 
Expected Outcome: Discussions on this 
issue are likely to focus on the submissions, 
the consultative process and how the regional 
workshops and/or meetings will be 
4U 
structured. It is unlikely that more than one 
workshop will be held before the end of the 
year. 
Articles 4.8 and 4.9 
Decision 5/CP.4 contains a program of work 
that should provide the basis for discussions 
in June. Parties will have submitted views on 
issues to be discussed at an experts workshop 
(to be held in September) by the end of April 
Expected Outcome: Discussions are likely 
to focus on the submissions by Parties with 
the outcome being the terms of reference for 
the workshop. 
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Technical workshop on mechanisms 
Primary issues discussed around CDM were: 
1. Design of the COM: Its operation 
and governance 
• Range of different options for financing of 
CDM project - bilateral, multilateral, 
portfolio of projects offered by one or 
several governments -> more projects 
• Role and function of Executive Board 
• As centralised forum which provides 
consistent and transparent decision 
making - this raises transaction costs 
Role limited to design of criteria for 
reviews -this reduces transaction costs 
2. Baselines/baseline methodologies 
• Different approaches put forward 
included: 
Project specific approach - precise 
baseline based on the technical 
specification and/or operational 
records of existing facilities 
Technology benchmark matrix 
approach - forms a baseline by 
country and by technology category, 
with a benchmark suitable for groups 
of similar CDM projects (results in 
lower transaction costs in 
implementation) 
Top-down baseline- the total national 
emissions in a given year would be 
divided and assigned as baseline 
emissions by sector, region, technology 
etc in a top-down manner 
• Differences centred around support for the 
different methodological approaches: 
• Some supported the use of project-by-
project approach in early stages of 
CDM, but to lower transaction costs 
technology benchmark approach to be 
used eventually 
• Some supported the use of the project-
by-project approach only 
US supported the use of the 
technology benchmark approach for 
some sectors, for example the 
electricity sector 
3. Adaptation 
• Who benefits from adaptation funding? 
Those involved in CDM or all vulnerable 
countries? 
• Suggestion on developing a vulnerability 
index that would allow objective 
assessment to facilitate decision-making 
about adaptation and would ensure 
distribution of proceeds to address the 
needs of vulnerable groups - to achieve 
this, need to identify sources of 
vulnerability for various geographic 
regions and contexts 
• Questions that need to be answered: 
What does adaptation mean? 
• How to determine the share of CDM 
proceeds? 
• Burdensharing of proceeds between 
Parties? 
• Apportionment between administrative 
expenses and adaptation funds? 
• What adaptation projects will be 
eligible for funding? 
• Definition of vulnerability? 
4. Assisting in arranging funding 
• World Bank highlighted the importance 
of investment funds to spread the risk 
(such as the Prototype Carbon Fund) 
and encourage investment in Africa -
BUT what incentive exists for fund 
manager to include them in his portfolio 
unless he expects credits at a cheaper 
price 
• Statements focused on relationship 
between ODA and CDM and financial 
additionality- suggested that COP agree 
on level of ODA from which the financial 
flows related to climate are additional; 
rethink use of GEF money before CDM 
becomes operational in year 2000 
5. Validation, verification and 
certification: Technical and process 
issues 
• Discussion focused on potential to 
apply ISO type standards 
.. 
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6. Early action on COM 
• need transitional rules for the early 
start of COM - identified need for 
further work on this interim phase 
Issues raised by Parties 
Developing countries 
• supplementarity (China, India) 
• need for host country to decide on 
whether projects promote sustainable 
development (China, India, Venezuela) 
• need to assist the developing countries in 
achieving compliance (China) 
• additionality of funding (China, India) 
• project-by-project baselines (China, India) 
• fungibility unacceptable (should not be 
tradeable) (China, India) 
• fair distribution of projects (China, India) 
• Executive board not to exceed 25 
members and take into consideration 
subregional balance (Uganda) 
4L 
• COM operate in mix mode 
multilaterally, bilaterally and with a 
general fund - with the same rules, 
procedures and principles (Uganda) 
Developed countries 
• EU 
• preconditions for participation in the 
COM should be that both must ratify 
the Protocol, be bound by a 
compliance regime adopted by the 
COP/MOP, have not been excluded 
from participation in the COM, comply 
with commitments under Article 12 
• Umbrella Group 
• work needed on compliance, linkages 
between mechanisms and advantage 
of fungibility between the mechanisms 
• us 
• two baseline choices: project by project 
and technology benchmark 
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Climate change capacity building programmes 
There are several programmes, both within and outside the UNFCCC ambit that are meant 
to support developing nations in their effort to carry out climate change activities. Such 
programs are specifically aimed at capacitating policy makers, climate change negotiating 
teams, business executives and NCO leaders about the Climate change Convention and 
Protocols. In addition, some tertiary institutions also run training programs . 
Prog- Objectives and modus Targets Contact details 
rammes operandi 
A UNDP To assist interested host parties Provide policy makers and Geir Sjoberg (Prog. 
CDMJAIJ in exploring climate change enterprises with guidance and coordinator), Energy 
Capacity project-based mechanisms and specific examples on how & Atmosphere 
Building how such mechanisms can prepare relevant projects. Programme, 
Programme support sustainable Integrates local counterparts. Sustainable Energy development objectives UNDP Country Offices and and Environment 
Supports the Kyoto and Buenos Energy and Atmosphere Division, UNDP-
Aires follow-up Programme, GEF and Public- 304.45th Street-Office 
Private Partnership units FF 842, New York. 
NY 10017-U.S.A 
Tel. (212) 906-06512 
Fax. (212) 906-5148 
B. UNFCCC To assist developing nations to National experts, policy Climate change 
Climate prepare national makers and sectoral training programme 
~Change communications, through policy representatives who could (CC:TRAIN),United 
Training and technical training facilitate policy and decision- Nations Institute for 
Programme workshops. making on climate change Training and 
(Cc:Train) Support nationally driven issues Research, Palais des 
processes which focus on Staff could attend short and Nations, 1211 
producing certain policy- longer courses on specific GENEVA 10, 
supported outcomes areas covered by the Switzerland 
Subject areas include: CC, programme, eg 6- month Tel: (41-22) 788-1417 
UNFCCC & the Kyoto Protocol: course (41-22) 798-5850 ext 
challenges and opportunities, During a 3-year period the 257,258,259 
National GHG Inventory, country team is trained, Fax: (41-22) 733-
Mitigation Analysis, Vulnerability supported financially and 1383 
& Adaptation Assessment technically, and made Email: Certificate Programme, National responsible for: overseeing 
cctrain@initar.org Implementation Strategy & analytical studies on climate 
National Communications change issues, drafting 
CC: TRAIN Operates through national implementation 
two major Programmes, i.e strategies, implementing 
Pacific Islands Climate change national workshops and 
Assistance Programme conferences, organising 
(PICCAP- a GEF capacity consultative meetings and 
public education, awareness ' building programme involving 
12 Pacific Islands countries) and and participation activities. 
Vulnerability and Adaptation 
Assessment Certificate 
Programme- a University based 
6 month certificate course on 
CC offered by the Universities of 
Waikato, New Zealand and 
South Pacific 
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- Prog- Objectives and modus Targets Contact details 
rammes operandi 
I 
- I 
C. UNEP, To enhance the capacity of non- The project has three Ms BO Urn, National ! 
UNDP& annex 1 Parties to prepare their components: Communications i 
GEF initial national communications The help desk which provides Support Unit, UNDP-
National To improve the quality, countries with better access to GEF. 304 East 45th 
Communi-
comprehensiveness and information for preparing their Street 10/F, New 
cations timeliness of initial national national communications York, NY 10017. USA 
1 Programmes communications from non- Technical assistance on the Tel: 1-212-906-5730 
I 
Annex 1 Parties to the UNFCCC 
areas of greenhouse Fax: 1-212-906-6998 
To ensure timely and cost inventories, abatement studies, Email: 
I effective implementation of GEF vulnerability and adaptation Bo.Lim@undQ.org 
climate change enabling activity assessments 
or 
-
-
-
. 
projects Regional thematic training Mr Ravi Sharma, 
i workshops Climate Change 
I Enabling Activities. 
i 
UNEP, Nairobi. Kenya· 
Tel: 254-2-62-4215 I 
' 
-
-
Fax: 254-2-62-3410 
-
i 
Email: 
ravi.sharma@ unep. I 
-
org 
D. Harvard The Executive Program is Climate change diplomats Executive Program on 
!Institute for designed to: Policy makers Climate Change International 
I Provide participants with an NGO leaders interested in the Harvard Institute for Develop-
understanding of the complex International 
ment (HIID) issues that lie at the interface of science and economics of Development, 14 
climate change and climate change etc Story Street, 
-
- development. Cambridge, MA 
Offers lectures on: science of 02138,USA 
-
climate change, carbon Tel: 617-495-5999 
sequestration. economics of Fax: 617-496-3956: 
', 
climate change, abatement and 617-496-8040 ; 
-
adaptation, COM, monitoring ' E-mail: ' 
and enforcement, emissions 
climate(Q)hiid.harvard. i 
trading and other instruments. 
edu ! 
international law and 
I conventions etc. 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
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Climate change internet resources 
UNITED NATIONS AND WORLD 
BANK 
UNFCCC Secretariat 
www. unfccc.de 
The Secretariat site carries full texts of the 
relevant UN documentation, as well as Real 
Audio and video files from the global 
negotiations, particularly COP 4 in Buenos 
Aires. The site also includes updates on the 
state of implementation of the UNFCCC in 
most country Parties. In addition, the site 
contains administrative information, 
including submission deadlines and 
workshop and meeting arrangements. Links 
to other sites, including other relevant UN 
organisations can also be found at the 
UNFCCC Secretariat site. Resource materials 
to be found at the site include: 
• Official FCCC documents; including 
documents of the COP, subsidiary bodies 
(SBI, SBSTA, AGBM, AG13) and 
summaries and in-depth reviews of the 
national communications of Parties 
• Methodological information 
• Technological information 
Country information 
Inter-governmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) 
www.ipcc.ch 
The IPCC consists of about 2,000 scientists 
from around the world commissioned to 
investigate the causes and possible solutions 
to the climate change problem. The IPCC 
Working Group I is concerned with 
developments in the scientific understanding 
of past and present climate, of climate 
variability, of climate predictability and of 
climate change including feedbacks from 
climate impacts; progress in the modelling 
and projection of global and regional climate 
and sea level change; observations of 
climate, including past climates, and 
assessment of trends and anomalies; and 
gaps and uncertainties in current knowledge. 
Working Group II assesses the scientific, 
technical, environmental, economic, and 
social aspects of the vulnerability of 
ecological systems, socio-economic sectors, 
and human health to climate change; 
assesses the negative and positive impacts of 
climate change on these systems and sectors; 
and emphasises regional sectoral and cross-
sectoral issues. Working Group III is 
concerned with the scientific, technicaL 
environmental, and economic and social 
aspects of mitigation of climate change. 
Technical reports of the IPCC working groups 
are available at the site. 
Global Environmental Facility (GEF) 
www.gefweb.org 
The GEF is the interim financial mechanism 
for the UNFCCC which provides grants and 
concessional funds to developing countries 
for projects and activities that aim to protect 
the global environment. 
Resources to be found at the site include: 
• Evaluation of the efficiency and 
effectiveness of the GEF as the financial 
mechanism 
• List of GEF projects and programmes 
• Guide to GEF guidelines and operational 
strategy 
• Information on council meeting 
documents, intersessional documents, and 
implementing agencies 
UNEP Collaborating Centre 
www.risoe.dk orwww.risoe.dk/sys-ucc/ 
The UNEP Collaborating Centre is one of the 
special units based at the Ris0 National 
Laboratory in Denmark. It's site houses one 
of the most complete sources of climate 
change information on the internet. The site 
includes: 
• Methodological guidelines for GHG 
limitations 
• Information on climate change policy 
instruments 
UNEP Information Unit for Conventions 
(IUC) www.unep.ch/iuc 
UNEP' s IUC works with treaty secretariats 
with the aim of promoting public 
understanding of and support for 
environmental conventions. With this target, 
the IUC site provides simple information on 
climate change and the history and reasoning 
behind the climate change Convention. 
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Includes basic information on the 
Convention, including a Beginners Guide to 
the Framework Convention. The site 
provides a Climate Change Information Kit 
and a set of more than 90 fact sheets. Also 
available is the quarterly newsletter the UN 
Climate Change Bulletin. 
World Bank: Global Climate Change 
www-esd.worldbank.org/cc/ 
The site covers the World Bank Energy-
Environment Strategy; the Carbon 
Backcasting Study; the World Bank-GEF 
Climate Change Portfolio; the Global 
Overlays for Climate Change; AIJ Program; 
National Strategy Studies Program; and the 
Global Carbon Initiative. The web-site hosts 
discussion groups and provides a calendar of 
events. Information on the World Bank's 
Prototype Carbon Fund can also be accessed 
from this site. 
World Meteorological Organisation 
(WMO) www.wmo.ch/ 
The site includes details on major 
programmes, such as the World Climate 
Program (WCP). One component of the 
WCP is the World Climate Data and 
Monitoring Program, where the WMO posts 
its Statement on the Status of the Global 
Climate. The site also provides access to the 
Global Climate Observing System (GOOS). 
INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH 
ORGANISATIONS 
International Energy Agency 
www.iea.org or www.iea.org/climat.html 
This site covers climate and energy-related 
documents and information. The main 
features include the Climate Technology 
Initiative, the IPCC/OECD/IEA programme 
on national GHG inventories and the lEA 
publications and briefs on climate change. 
The lEA has jointly organised workshops on 
the COM for non-Annex I groupings (Latin 
America, Africa, Asia). 
Organisation for Economic 
Development www.oecd.org 
This site provides access to online documents 
on climate change policies and measures; 
and information on the IPCC/OECD/IEA 
programme on national GHG inventories 
and the Forum on climate change established 
by the OECD. 
NGO AND PUBLIC INTEREST 
ORGANISATIONS 
Enda Energy 
www.enda.sn/energie/inexpea.html 
4b 
A branch of Enda Third World, an 
international organisation with diplomatic 
status based in Dakar, Senegal. Enda Energy 
provides an NGO development perspective 
on climate change, focusing specifically on 
Africa. Enda has jointly organised and hosted 
regional workshops on the COM. Primary· 
focus issues include: 
• Climate change and sustainable 
development 
• Equity and climate change 
• Capacity building 
• Climate change mitigation analysis 
Centre for Science and Environment 
(CSE) www.oneworld.org/cse/index.html 
Based in Delhi, the CSE is a public-interest 
organisation which provides a strong 
southern perspective on the climate change 
negotiations, as well as a forum for climate 
change debate. The CSE dossier provides an 
interesting perspective on the politics and 
issues to be discussed in the negotiations. 
Issues of focus include: 
• equity and entitlements, and 
• political analysis of the negotiations. 
Tata Energy Research Institute (TERI) 
www.teriiin.org 
Based in New Delhi, TERI's Centre for 
Global Environmental Research undertakes 
policy research that aims to integrate 
developing country concerns in the search for 
equitable and effective solutions to global 
environmental challenges. The Centre 
focuses its activities on Asia, and specifically 
India, but also provides capacity building in 
other developing countries. Issued covered 
include: 
• GHG emissions inventories 
• Abatement strategies and policies 
• Assessment of impacts 
• Adaptation strategies and policies 
• Tracking and analysing issues arising from 
the international climate change 
negotiations 
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Climate Change in Asia 
www.ccasia.teri.res.in/ 
This site is developed and managed by TERI. 
The site provides country information on 
GHG inventories, mitigation options, 
vulnerability and adaptation, and activities 
and projects. In addition, the site presents 
country specific climate change publications, 
as well as regional studies. 
ECO -The Climate Action Network 
www.igc.org/climate/eco.html 
The Climate Action Network (CAN) is a non-
governmental environmental network which 
aims to promote government and individual 
action to limit human-induced climate 
change to ecologically sustainable levels. 
CAN produces the ECO-newsletter which is 
found at this site. The ECO-newsletter 
provides daily coverage of the negotiations 
on the Convention. It focuses on the corridor 
talk and provides a critical environmental 
perspective on the politicking at the 
negotiations. 
International Institute for Sustainable 
Development www.iisd.ca 
The Canadian-based IISD produces the 
multimedia Linkages Journal of which the 
Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) is part. 
ENB tracks the international climate change 
negotiations and provides daily coverage of 
the COPs. The site contains information on 
past and upcoming international meetings 
related to climate change. 
Resources for the Future 
www.weathervane.rff.org 
US think tank covering climate, AIJ and 
COM. An online forum designed to provide 
the news media, legislators, opinion leaders 
and interested public with analysis and 
commentary on US and global policy 
initiatives related to climate change. Covers 
both political and technical aspects of climate 
change. Shows highly conflicting arguments 
from many different areas in the world and is 
hence a genuine forum. 
World Resources Institute 
www.wri.org or 
www.wri.org/climchng.html 
US non-governmental organisation covering 
the COM and other climate-related issues. 
Information resources cover climate, energy 
and transportation. 
Centre for Clean Air Policy (CCAP) 
www.ccap.org 
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CCAP is a US NGO working on ozone and 
climate issues. Focus areas include baselines 
for AIJ and COM. 
Global Environment Information Centre 
www.geic.or.jp 
Based in Japan, the GEIC carries a wide 
range of information, including online access 
Global Climate Governance: Inter-linkages 
between the Kyoto Protocol and other multi-
lateral regimes, which includes papers on ** 
FLEXIBLE MECHANISMS 
UNFCCC-CC:INFO/AIJ 
www.unfccc.de/fccc/ccinfo/defaij.html 
The Secretariat's AIJ page tracks all the AIJ 
projects carried out to date, and summarises 
the lessons learned from the AIJ experience. 
UNCTAD 
www.unctad.org/en/subsites/etrade/ 
index.html 
The United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) site on GHG 
emissions trading includes information on its 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Policy 
Forum and the International Emissions 
Trading Association (lETA) initiative. The site 
provides online access to UNCTAD's COM 
concept paper, a work in progress, which 
focuses on four areas - project design and 
implementation aspects, international trading 
aspects, the financial aspects, and the 
institutional aspects of the COM. 
Axel Michaelowa 
www.perso.easynet.fr/-michaelo/ji.html 
Michaelowa provides insight into the 
technical, economic and political aspects of 
flexible mechanisms. The site includes a 
history of Joint Implementation and online 
access to Michaelowa's publications. 
Publications include papers different aspects 
of the COM, such as baselines for COM 
projects, early crediting of emissions rights, 
compliance, and credit creation and sharing. 
Michaelowa's texts feed directly into the 
negotiations. 
Joint Implementation Network (JIN) 
www.northsea.nl/jiq/ 
Based in the Netherlands, JIN produces the 
Joint Implementation Quarterly (JIQ). 
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World Bank AIJ Programme www-
esd.worldbank.org/aij/ 
This site outlines the components of the 
World Bank's AIJ Program, the evaluation 
guidelines for the AIJ pilot projects and the 
AIJ pilot project reports. 
Jl Online -US Initiative on Joint 
Implementation www.ji.org/ji_onlin.html 
The US Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) host the US Joint Implementation site 
which outlines the US approach and how to 
apply for an AIJ project with US support. The 
site links directly to the US Initiative on Joint 
Implementation (USIJI). 
Swiss AIJ Pilot Programme 
www.admin.ch/swissaij/ 
The SWAPP home page provides access to 
the Swiss policy on AIJ/JI, an overview of the 
AIJ programme and its activities and projects, 
and an information network. The site also 
provides a list of links to other useful sites. 
CLIMATE CHANGE 
TECHNOLOGIES 
Climate Technology Initiative (CTI) 
www.climatetech.net 
The CTI is supported by the US EPA and the 
US Department of Energy, in collaboration 
with the National Renewable Energy 
Laboratory (NREL), the lEA and the OECD. 
CTI aims to make available the information 
and tools necessary for identifying and 
implementing cost-effective renewable energy 
and energy efficiency projects through the 
internet. CTI focus areas include country 
information exchange, expert systems and 
market information. The site has a good 
search programme. 
Greenhouse Gas Technology 
Information Exchange 
www.greentie.org/ 
The GREENTIE site provides information on 
GHG mitigating technologies and gives 
contact details for approximately 7 500 
organisations and experts. The scope of the 
information includes energy and GHG 
mitigation technologies, classified by 
technology expertise, industry, products etc. 
Global Energy Marketplace (GEM) 
gem.crest.org/ 
4tl 
The GEM site is an on-line searchable 
database of more than 2 500 energy 
efficiency and renewable energy annotated 
web links. The scope of the database includes 
case studies, reports, publications, economic 
analyses, product directories, discussion 
groups, and mitigation assessments. 
BUSINESS PERSPECTIVES 
Pew Center on Global Climate Change 
www. pewclimate.org/home.html 
US big business interests (Boeing, BP, 
Dupont, Lockheed Martin and others) co-
operate through the Pew Centre on Global 
Climate Change to improve understanding 
of policy, scientific and economic issues 
concerning climate change. Areas of focus 
include: 
• Analysis of early action crediting 
proposals 
• Impacts of policy choices on the costs of 
climate change mitigation 
• Impacts of climate change on agriculture, 
water, forestry, coastal resources, health 
and ecosystems in the US 
Enda argue that it is the most informed and 
reasonable of the business sites on climate 
change. 
INTERNATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 
Centre for International Environmental 
aw www.econet.apc.org/ciellindex.html 
Based in the USA, the Centre for 
International Environmental Law (CIEL) 
covers broad issues around international 
environmental law, including the protection 
of the global commons. With regard to the 
international climate change agreements, 
CIEL focuses on issues of compliance or non-
compliance and of global climate change in 
foreign policy. 
FIELD www.field.org.uk/climate.html 
The Climate Change and Energy Programme 
of the Foundation for International 
Environmental Law and Development 
(FIELD) works closely with the Alliance of 
Small Island States (AOSIS). FIELD have 
assisted AOSIS in drafting a protocol that 
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would require industrialised nations to reduce 
their C02 emissions which proved central to 
the negotiations around the Kyoto Protocol. 
Field also provided legal and policy advice 
around the design and operation of the GEF. 
In addition, the team provide insightful 
analysis of the COM, its operation and 
design. Field publishes a journal called 
RECIEL which 
CLIMATE CHANGE SCEPTICS 
The following list of sites, produced mostly by 
business lobbies, express, in general, 
scepticism about either the science or the 
politics of global warming. Some are more 
extreme than others. The Science and 
Environmental Policy Project carry an 
interesting monitor of the US Press portrayal 
of climate change. The Global Climate 
Coalition were responsible for the huge 
lobbying effort that set the US Congress 
against Kyoto in 1997. 
• Center for the Study of Carbon Dioxide 
and Global Change 
www.co2science.org/ 
• George C. Marshall Institute-
environment 
www.marshall.org/gwindex.html 
• Global Climate Coalition 
www.globalclimate.org/ 
4~ 
• Science and Environmental Policy Project 
www.sepp.org/ 
• World Climate Report 
www.nhes.com/ 
• Global Climate Information Project 
www. climatefact. org/ 
• American Petroleum Institute 
www .a pi .org. globalclimate/ starta.html 
• Coalition for Vehicle Choice 
www. vehiclechoice.org/ 
• CEI: Global Warming Resource 
www.cei.org/gw.html 
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